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Science Fact or Science Fiction?
The Implications of Court-Ordered
Genetic Testing Under Rule 35
By ANTHONY S. NIEDWIECKI*
IMAGINE BEING FORCED to undergo medical testing for a disease
that has no cure and no treatment. This scenario may soon become
a reality as litigants attempt to discover previously unknown genetic
information using Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure' or
an equivalent state law. 2 Rule 35 allows a court to order physical or
mental examinations of a party and is most often used by defendants
to disprove plaintiffs' claims of physical or emotional injuries. 3 Since a
Rule 35 order compels a person to undergo a medical procedure, it is
one of the most intrusive forms of discovery. Without stringent safe-
guards, the order has the potential to cause litigants great emotional
or physical harm. This is especially true when a court orders genetic
testing for a disease that has no cure or treatment. In such circum-
stances the court has provided the examinee with nothing less than a
death sentence.
Introduction
Even before genetic testing was possible, courts have been willing
to order examinations that have the potential to cause great psycho-
logical harm to the examinee. The most dramatic example of a court-
ordered test occurred when a federal district court ordered a plaintiff
* Abraham L. Freedman Teaching Fellow and Lecturer in Law, Beasley School of
Law at Temple University. Special thanks to Rick Greenstein, Scott Burris, Clay Beery,
Rachel Arnow Richman, and Courtney Lytle for their helpful and supportive comments on
earlier drafts, and to Andrew Hurda for his able research assistance.
1. FED. R. CIv. P. 35.
2. Rule 35 is generally duplicated under each state's discovery rules. Any mention of
Rule 35 in this article also refers to each state's equivalent unless expressly stated
otherwise.
3. See, e.g., Thiessen v. General Elec. Capital Corp., 178 F.R.D. 568 (D. Kan. 1998)
(disproving physical injuries of water in the lungs and congestive heart failure); Neal v.
Siegel-Robert, Inc., 171 F.R.D. 264 (E.D. Mo. 1996) (attempting to disprove a claim that
plaintiff suffered psychological trauma from alleged discrimination).
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to undergo Human-Immunodeficiency Virus ("H1V") antibody test-
ing.4 In an effort to reduce the amount of future damages to be
awarded, the defendant asked the court to order an HIV test to prove
that, if the result was positive, the plaintiff would have a shorter life
expectancy. 5 Because of the traumatic nature of a positive HIV test
result, and the court's apparent ease in mandating such a test, this
case has severe implications for court-ordered genetic testing in the
future.
With the advent of new scientific technology, litigants increas-
ingly rely on the use of scientific evidence, most notably genetic infor-
mation, to prove their cases or to discredit their opponents' cases.
6
This is especially true in criminal cases where prosecutors use Deox-
yribose Nucleic Acid ("DNA") analysis to link defendants to certain
crimes.7 The use of genetics has now made its way into the civil court-
room as well.8 When Rule 35 was first adopted in 1938, genetic sci-
ence was almost nonexistent and no one could have possibly
contemplated the advances that are currently being made on an al-
most daily basis.9 Not even twenty years ago could people realistically
have predicted that one day a scientist could examine a piece of hair
and determine so much information about an individual, including
whether he or she may be susceptible to developing a particular
disease. 10
Such advances are now possible because scientists from around
the world are discovering the entire blueprint of the human genome
4. See Pettyjohn v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., No. 91-CV-2681, 1992 WL 105162, at
*1 (E.D. Pa. 1992).
5. See id.
6. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Koehler, 737 A.2d 225 (Pa. 1999) (holding DNA evidence
admissible to show that defendant could not be excluded as the source of the semen found
on the murder victim's body).
7. See id.
8. See Bennett v. Fieser, No. 93-1004-MLB, 1994 WL 542089, at *2 (D. Kan. 1994);
Dodd-Anderson v. Stevens, Nos. 92-1015-MLB, 92-1016-MLB, 1993 WL 273373, at *1 (D.
Kan. 1993). These cases are discussed more thoroughly later in this article. See infra Part I.
9. See generally Tim Friend, Project to Chart All Genes, GANNEYFr NEWS SERV., Oct. 3,
1989, available in 1989 WL 4860540 (discussing the advances and goals of the Human Gen-
ome Project).
10. For a more complete discussion on how genetic testing has evolved, see MichaelJ.
MalinowskiJ.D. & RobinJ.R. Blatt, M.P.H., R.N., Commercialization of Genetic Testing Services:
The PDA, Market Forces, and Biological Tarot Cards, 71 TUL. L. REV. 1211, 1217 (1997); Robert
Guy Matthews, Traces of You: The Perfect Crime May be a Thing of the Past, Now That DNA
Testing Can Identify a Person by Hair, a Speck of Skin or a Drop of Saliva. But is This Science to be
Feared? Baltimore Sun, Aug. 13, 1998, at IF.
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in a project called the Human Genome Project ("Project"). I The Pro-
ject began in 1990 with the dual goals of identifying the estimated
100,000 genes in the human DNA by 2005 and to develop tools to
analyze the three billion pairs of chemical bases of which DNA is
made. 12 The mapping of the human genetic code is expected to be
nearly complete by the spring of 2000, with a final map expected by
2002.13 The ultimate goal of the Project is to find a cure for all genetic
diseases.' 4 As a result of the Project, doctors are now able to screen for
serious health conditions including cancer, Alzheimer's Disease, and
heart disease.15 Mapping allows scientists to identify genetic mutations
responsible for causing specific diseases.' 6 The identification of such
mutations, however, does not necessarily mean that science has discov-
ered a cure or treatment: "Progress to date indicates that the ability to
diagnose a genetic abnormality precedes the development of thera-
peutic interventions and that this gap may be growing.
''17
Each genetic test produces varying types of information depend-
ing on the characteristics of the disease being tested and the accuracy
of the test.' 8 For example, a positive result for one test may indicate an
eighty percent chance of developing a debilitating and deadly disease
within fifteen years, while a positive result for a different test may pre-
dict only a twenty percent chance of contracting a manageable and
treatable disease.' 9 Depending on the information produced by a ge-
netic test, a number of potential risks may be involved. Such risks in-
clude: psychological harm to the individual tested; emotional harm to
third parties;20 and economic harm if the information is disclosed to
persons outside of the litigation.2' Since genetic tests are limited in
the type of information that they produce-usually only predicting a
statistical likelihood that a person may develop a medical condi-
11. See Leroy Hood & Lee Rowen, Genes, Genomes, and Society in GENETIC SECRETS: PRO-
TECTING PRIVACY AND CONFIDENTIALITY IN THE GENETIC ERA 3, 8 (1997).
12. See Mark A. Rothstein & Sharona Hoffman, Genetic Testing, Genetic Medicine, and
Managed Care, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 849, 853-54 (1999); Carl T. Hall, Genome Project
Within a Year of Completion, Official Says, S.F. CHRON., June 11, 1999, at A7.
13. See Hall, supra note 12, at A7.
14. See Rothstein & Hoffman, supra note 12, at 854.
15. See infra Part lI.B.
16. See infra Part II.B.
17. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES, MAPPING
OUR GENES: GENOME PROJECTS: How BIG, How FAST? 83 (1988).
18. See infta Part II.B. (discussing the difference in genetic test results).
19. See infra Part II.B. (discussing the difference in genetic. test results).
20. See infra Part IV.
21. See infra Part TV.
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tion 22-they have limited usefulness to the truth-seeking mission of
the court. The statistical data produced by a genetic test may, there-
fore, only confuse the court and cause undue harm to the person
tested.
This article proposes an analysis for courts to follow when faced
with a Rule 35 motion to compel a party to undergo genetic testing or
any other procedure that tests for a specific medical condition. Part I
explains the analysis courts generally conduct for a Rule 35 motion.
Generally, courts make a factual inquiry into whether there is a need
for the procedure and whether the examinee has placed his or her
physical or mental condition in controversy.2 3 Rarely have courts ex-
amined the risks associated with ordering an examination.2 4 When
courts do examine the risks, they continue to show a willingness to
order exams that are quite intrusive, that impact persons outside of
the lawsuit, and that involve tests open to a wide range of
interpretations.
Part II examines how courts have begun to order genetic tests in
civil cases without any consideration of the purpose of the tests or the
risks associated with ordering them. This section explores genetic test-
ing, focusing on three specific diseases in an effort to illustrate the
wide variance of information produced by different genetic tests.
Part III considers the similarities between HIV testing and genetic
testing, and details the implications of court-ordered HIV testing or
genetic testing under Rule 35. This section examines the cases that
have considered motions for court-ordered HIV testing, and shows a
division among the courts: first, those courts that recognize that Ac-
quired Immune Deficiency Syndrome ("AIDS") is unique, and sec-
ond, those that treat HIV testing like any other type of examination. A
similar division has occurred among public health officials and civil
libertarians when debating policy regarding HIV. This debate has pit-
ted traditionalists, those who believe all diseases should be treated
similarly,25 against "exceptionalists," those who believe that HIV is so
unique that it deserves exceptional treatment in the law.26 This debate
has begun to encompass policy decisions regarding genetic informa-
tion.2 7 Part III concludes by describing the current arguments in the
22. See infra Part II.B.
23. See infra Part I.C.
24. See infra Part I.A.
25. See infra Part III.B.
26. See infra Part III.B.
27. See infra Part III.C.
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"genetic exceptionalism" debate and proposes to eliminate the label-
ing of diseases as exceptional or non-exceptional. It is argued instead
that any testing policy should be based on the characteristics that
make each disease unique.
Finally, part IV proposes that courts faced with a Rule 35 motion
should apply the approach developed in Part III and should thor-
oughly examine the unique characteristics of each genetic test. This
would require the court to amend its fact-driven analysis of Rule 35 to
include an "examination of the examination." This analysis requires
the court to thoroughly examine the informational risks associated
with ordering a genetic test and to determine whether the test results
will prove useful to the court before it orders a genetic test. This sec-
tion takes a detailed look at the specific informational risks associated
with genetic testing and concludes that there is a general lack of use-
fulness of genetic test results in litigation.
I. Rule 35 and Its State Counterparts
Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and its state law
counterparts give courts the power to compel litigants to undergo
mental or physical examinations. 28 Courts have used this broad grant
of authority to order a wide range of examinations, including psycho-
logical exams related to sexual trauma,29 HIV tests,30 and, most re-
28. See infra Part I.A.
29. See, e.g., Marvelle v. Nevada, 966 P.2d 151, 154-55 (Nev. Sup. Ct. 1998) (holding
that the defendant, who was convicted of the sexual assault of a child under 14 years of age,
was denied a fair trial because the trial court refused to permit psychological testing of the
victim); Weiss v. Amoco Oil Co., 142 F.R.D. 311, 314, 316 (S.D. Iowa 1992) (holding that
the plaintiff could depose a non-party witness concerning the witness' sexual history in
connection with plaintiff's claim that he was wrongfully discharged after the witness made
allegations of sexual harassment against him); Anderson v. Alaska, 749 P.2d 369, 371
(Alaska Ct. App. 1988) (holding that defendants, who were convicted of sexual abuse of a
minor, were entitled to have the minor examined by a court-appointed mental health prac-
titioner); Anson v. Fickel, 110 F.R.D. 184, 185-86 (N.D. Ind. 1986) (holding that the
mental condition of a plaintiff in a traffic accident case was in controversy where plaintiff
sought compensation for emotional distress, defendant had demonstrated good cause for
the examination, and the federal rules authorized examination of plaintiff by a clinical
psychologist).
30. See, e.g., Sacramona v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 152 F.R.D. 428, 431-32 (D.C.
Mass. 1993) (holding that the defendants in a personal injury action were not entitled to a
compelled HIV blood test despite plaintiff's claim for future damages and his lifestyle,
which included sharing hypodermic needles); Pettyjohn v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,
No. 91-CV2681, 1992 WL 105162, at *1 (E.D. Pa. 1992) (holding that defendants in a
personal injury suit were entitled to a compelled HIV blood test because plaintiff had
placed his life expectancy in controversy by seeking future damages).
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cently, genetic tests. 31 These tests have been ordered although the
rules do not specifically refer to, nor likely contemplate, the psycho-
logically intrusive nature of these exams. Since no discovery rules exist
that specifically address (or limit) a court's authority to order genetic
tests, courts have looked to Rule 35 for guidance in compelling such
tests. 32 The members of the Ethical, Legal & Social Implications of the
Human Genome Project Task Force, in fact, proposed allowing courts
to use Rule 35 to compel genetic testing when they drafted the Ge-
netic Privacy Act ("GPA").33
31. See, e.g., Bennett v. Fieser, No. 93-1004-MLB, 1994 WL 542089, at *2 (D. Kan.
1994) (ordering genetic test of a child in a medical malpractice action); Dodd-Anderson v.
Stevens, Nos. 92-1015-MLB, 92-1016-MLB, 1993 WL 273373, at *1 (D. Kan. 1993) (ordering
genetic testing of a child in a medical malpractice action); Sally Lehrman, Pushing Limits of
DNA Testing, S.F. EXAMINER, June 5, 1994, at Al (discussing the unreported case of Severson
v. K77 Chems, Inc.).
32. See, e.g., Lehrman, supra note 31, at Al (discussing the unreported case of Severson
v. KTI Chems, Inc.); Bennett, 1994 WL 542089, at *2; Dodd-Anderson, 1993 WL 273373, at
"1-'2.
33. See GEORGE J. ANNAS ET AL., THE GENETIC PRIVACY ACT AND COMMENTARY (1995)
(available by request from the Health Law Department, Boston University School of Public
Health, 80 East Concord St., Boston, MA 02118) (on file with the University of San Francisco
Law Review) [hereinafter ANNAS ET AL., THE GENETIC PRIVACY ACT]. Section 123 of the
Genetic Privacy Act sets forth the regulations for compelled genetic testing. See id. The only
difference between the Federal Rule 35, FED R. Civ. P. 35 , and section 123 is that the Act
mandates that the genetic sample taken from the subject be destroyed at the earliest op-
portunity after the test has been completed. Section 123 states:
(a) IN GENERAL.-Nothing in this Act shall be construed to prohibit the collec-
tion or analysis of an individually identifiable DNA sample pursuant to Rule 35 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or comparable rules of other courts or ad-
ministrative agencies in connection with litigation or proceeding to which the
sample source is a party and in which the genetic condition of the sample source
has been placed at issue, provided that the conditions in section (b) have been
met.
(b) ISSUANCE OF ORDERS.-An order under Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure or comparable rules may only be made:
(1) upon motion for good cause shown and upon notice to the sample
source or the sample source's representative and all parties; and
(2) the order must specify:
(A) the manner of collection of the DNA sample;
(B) the person or persons authorized to collect and analyze the sample;
(C) the purpose of the genetic analysis;
(D) that the genetic analysis is limited to that which is necessary to fulfill
the purpose of the order; and
(E) that the person conducting the analysis destroy the sample at the
earliest possible opportunity consistent with the purpose of that order.
Id. § 123.
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A. "In Controversy" and "Good Cause" Requirements Under
Rule 35 and State Counterparts
Courts are likely to rely on the history and previous treatment of
Rule 35 when analyzing motions for genetic testing, even though
traditional Rule 35 cases have involved basic or routine psychological
and physical examinations. 34 When analyzing a Rule 35 motion,
courts must, as an initial matter, determine if the person subject to the
examination has placed her mental or physical condition "in contro-
versy" and if "good cause" exists for the examination. 35
Every state except Mississippi and New Hampshire has passed
Rule 35 equivalents as part of its rules of civil procedure or rules of
court.3 6 A majority of states have passed "generic" versions of the rule
permitting mental or physical examinations. These provisions are
either identical to the federal Rule 35, or they are constructed with
substantially similar wording.37 Like the federal rules, these generic
34. See Niccol Kording & Janine P. DuMontelle, An Overview of Admissibility of Genetic
Trest Results in Federal Civil Actions, 19 WHITTIER L. REv. 681, 692 (1998).
35. FED. R. Civ. P. 35. Rule 35 provides:
When the mental or physical condition . . . of a party ... is in controversy, the
court in which the action is pending may order the party to submit to a physical
or mental examination by a suitably licensed or certified examiner .... The order
may be made only on motion for good cause shown ....
Id. See also Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104, 119-20 (1964) (holding that, where de-
fendant's bus collided with plaintiffs tractor-trailer, a sufficient showing was not made
under Rule 35 to support any medical or psychological examinations of defendant bus
driver);Jansen v. Packaging Corp. of Am., 158 F.R.D. 409, 411 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (appointing
independent expert to conduct medical examination of plaintiff because plaintiff had
placed her mental condition in issue in her action against her employer for sexual harass-
ment). These two requirements contrast with the very liberal discovery rules under Rule 26
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, FED. R. Civ. P. 26, where the only limitations on
discovery are that the information sought not be privileged, and the request for informa-
tion be reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
36. Mississippi is the only state without a rule setting forth the conditions and scope of
mental or physical examinations. See Miss. R. Civ. P. 35. Mississippi specifically declined to
adopt a rule providing for independent medical examinations as part of the Mississippi
Rules of Civil Procedure. The comment to the omitted Mississippi Rule 35 states that "Rule
35, Physical and Mental Examinations of Persons, is omitted from these rules." Id.
New Hampshire's Rule 35 equivalent is not spelled out as a specific and independent
rule like the remaining states. Rather, it is incorporated in a general provision governing
discovery in the New Hampshire Rules of Court. See N.H. R. SUPER. CT. 35. The provision
states that parties may obtain discovery by physical or mental examinations, but makes no
mention of the "in controversy" or "good cause" requirements of the federal rule. See id.
However, discovery under this provision is limited to "any matter, not privileged, which is
relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action." Id. at 35 (b)(1).
37. See FED. R. Civ. P. 35; ALA. R. CT. 35(a); ALAsKA CT. R. 35(a); COLO. CT. R. 35(a);
DEL. R. Civ. P. 35; D.C. CT. R. ANN. 35(a); FLA. R. Ca . 1.360; GA. CODE ANN. § 9-11-35
(1993); HAw. CT. R. 35(a); IDAHO CT. R. 35(a); IND. CT. R. 35(A); IowA R. CT. 132; Ky. R.
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state versions of Rule 35 require the mental or physical status of the
potential examinee be "in controversy" and "good cause" be shown
for the examinations. 38 They also require that notice be given to the
potential examinee setting forth the time, place, manner, conditions,
name of examiner, and scope of the examinations. 0 Additionally,
CT. CR 35.01; LA. CODE CIv. PROC. ANN. art. 1464; ME. R. CT. 35(a); MD. CODE ANN., CIv.
PROC. § 2-423 (1998); MASs. ANN. LAws, Civ. R. 35(a); MICH. CT. R. ANN. § 2.311 (A); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 35.01 (West 1996); Mo. CT. R. 60.01 (a); MONT. R. CT. 35(a); NEB. CT. R. &
PROC. 35(a); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 35(a) (Michie 1999); N.J. R. CT. 4:19; N.M. R. ANN. 1-
035(A); N.C. R. CIv. PROC. & EVID. ANN. R. 35(a); N.D. CT. R. ANN. 35(a); R.I. CT. R. ANN.
35(a); S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 15-6-35(a) (Michie 1984); TENN. CT. R. ANN. 35.01; VA. R. Sup.
CT. 4:10; W.VA. CODE ANN. § 35(a); Wyo. CT. R. ANN. 35(a).
38. See FED. R. Civ. P. 35; ALA. R. CT. 35(a); ALASKA CT. R. 35(a); COLO. CT. R. 35(a);
DEL. R. Civ. P. 35; D.C. CT. R. ANN. 35(a); FLA. R. CT. 1.360; GA. CODE ANN. § 9-11-35
(1993); HAW. CT. R. 35(a); IDAHO CT. R. 35(a); IND. CT. R. 35(A); IOWA R. CT. 132; Ky. R.
CT. CR 35.01; LA. CODE CIv. PROC. ANN. art. 1464; ME. R. CT. 35(a); MD. CODE ANN., CIV.
PROC. § 2-423 (1998); MASS. ANN. LAws, CIv. R. 35(a); MICH. CT. R. ANN. § 2.311 (A); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 35.01 (West 1996); Mo. CT. R. 60.01 (a); MONT. R. CT. 35(a); NEB. CT. R. &
PROC. 35(a); NEv. REV. STAT. ANN. § 35(a) (Michie 1999); N.J. R. CT. 4:19; N.M. R. ANN. 1-
035(A); N.C. R. CIv. PROC. & EVID. ANN. R. 35(a); N.D. CT. R. ANN. 35(a); R.I. CT. R. ANN.
35(a); S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 15-6-35(a) (Michie 1984); TENN. CT. R. ANN. 35.01; VA. R. Sup.
CT. 4:10; W.VA. CODE ANN. § 35(a); Wyo. CT. R. AN N. 35(a).
Connecticut's Rule 35 equivalent does not use the specific phrase "in controversy"
when setting forth the conditions under which the court can compel medical examina-
tions. See CONN. R. CT. 13-11. However, the rule does state that the court may order a party
to submit to a medical examination only when "the judicial authority finds it reasonably
probable that evidence outside the record will be required, in which the mental or physical
condition of a party... is material to the prosecution ... of the said action." Id. Thus, like
the "in controversy" requirement, the terminology of the Connecticut rule creates a similar:
burden that must be met by the moving party before the court can order examinations.
39. Several states have added additional safeguards to their Rule 35 equivalents in an
effort to protect the examinee. Common among a few states are additional clauses that
permit the examinee to have a representative present at the time of the examination. See
ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 35(a) (West Supp. 1998); CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 2032(g) (1) (West
1998); OKLA. CT. R. & PROC. § 3235(D); WASH. CT. R. 35(a); PA. R. CT. 4010(a)(1) (4) (I).
Some states allow (or require) that the examination be recorded stenographically or by
audiotape. SeeAmiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 35(a); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 2032(g) (2); PA. R. CT.
4010(a) (1) (5) (i). Arizona permits the examination to be videotaped upon a showing of
good cause. See ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 35(a). South Carolina allows the examinee's physi-
cian to be present during the examination. See S.C. R. CT. 35(a) (1999).
In further attempts to protect the examinee, California limits the number of examina-
tions to one, and imposes a monetary sanction against any party who unsuccessfully makes
a motion for an examination. See CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 2032. Furthermore, California
prohibits any examinations that are "painful, protracted, or intrusive." Id. California and
South Carolina both limit where an examination may be conducted. See CAL. CIV. PROC.
CODE § 2032; S.C. R. CT. 35(a). In California, the examination must be conducted within
75 miles of the residence of the examinee. See CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 2032. In South
Carolina, examination must occur in the county where the examinee, or his physician
reside. See S.C. R. CT. 35(a). Also, special consideration is given to the examinee in setting
the time and place of the examination. See id. In Illinois, the examining party shall pay any
lost wages and all reasonable expenses incurred by the examinee in complying with the
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many states require that the party demanding the examination de-
liver, upon request of the examinee, a copy of a detailed, written re-
port setting forth the examiner's findings, including the results of all
tests made, diagnoses, and conclusions.40 Furthermore, the same
states require a party requesting the examination to produce, upon
the request of the examinee, all like reports of examinations of the
same condition previously or thereafter made by the examiner.
4'
B. The Constitutionality of Rule 35
The Supreme Court first upheld Rule 35 in Sibbach v. Wilson,
42
where the plaintiff was ordered to undergo a medical examination in
a personal injury case. 43 The plaintiff challenged Rule 35 on the basis
that, in promulgating the rule, the Court exceeded the scope of its
authority under the Rules Enabling Act.44 The Court affirmed the
Act's validity and concluded Rule 35 did not deal with "important and
substantial rights theretofore recognized. '45 Rule 35 does not compro-
mise the privacy right to freedom from invasion of the person since a
party is free to refuse to comply. 46 The Court explained that "[t]he
suggestion that the rule offends the important right to freedom from
invasion of the person ignores the fact that, as we hold, no invasion of
freedom from personal restraint attaches to refusal so to comply with
its provisions. 4 7 Justice Frankfurter, speaking for the dissenters,
order for examination. ILL. CT. R. & PROC. 215. Finally, Illinois can also name an impartial
medical examiner to take the place of the examining party's named examiner if the court
believes that an independent examiner will "materially aid in the just determination of the
case." Id.
40. Thirty-six states specifically require in their Rule 35 equivalents that the examin-
ing party make and deliver a copy of the examination report to the examinee. This report
must set out the findings of the examiner, including results of all tests made, diagnoses,
and conclusions. See AlA. R. CT. 35(a); ALAsKA CT. R. 35(a); HAW. CT. R. 35(a); IDAHO C.
R. 35(a); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 35(a); N.M. R. ANN. 1-035(A); W.VA. CODE ANN. § 35(a);
Wvo. CT. R. ANN. 35(a).
41. After delivery of the written report to the examinee by the examiner, 34 states and
the federal rules entitle the person causing the examination to a like report of any exami-
nation, previously or thereafter made, of the same condition. See e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 35;
A A. R. CT. 35(a); ALAsKA CT. R. 35(a); CAtL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 2032; CONN. R. CT. § 13-11;
COLO. CT. R. 35(a); HAw. CT. R. 35(a); IDAHO CT. R. 35(a); N.M. R. ANN. 1-035(a); N.C. R.
CiV. PROC. & EviD. ANN. R. 35(a); N.D. CT. R. ANN. 35(a); OHIo Civ. R. 35 (1999-2000);
WASH. CT. R. 35(a); W.VA. CODE ANN. § 35(a); Wvo. CT. R. ANN. 35(a).
42. 312 U.S. 1 (1940).
43. See id., 312 U.S. at 16.
44. See id. at 7; see also Rules Enabling Act, Pub. L. No. 73-415, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934)
(authorizing the Supreme Court to promulgate the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
45. Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 13-14.
46. See id. at 14.
47 Id.
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viewed orders to undergo a medical examination as an "invasion of
the person" and noted that, as such, the orders "stand on a very differ-
ent footing from questions pertaining to the discovery of documents,
pre-trial procedure and other devices for the expeditious, economic
and fair conduct of litigation."48 Although Sibbach was decided by only
a 5-4 majority, the authority of federal court-ordered medical exami-
nations has not again been seriously challenged.
49
C. The Scope and Application of Rule 35
In Schlagenhauf v. Holder50 the Court set forth guidelines for the
"in controversy" and "good cause" requirements of Rule 35.51 The
Court stated that these requirements impose a greater burden than
mere relevancy:
[These requirements] are not met by mere conclusory allegations
of the pleadings-nor by mere relevance to the case-but require
an affirmative showing by the movant that each condition as to
which the examination is sought is really and genuinely in contro-
versy and that good cause exists for ordering each particular exam-
ination. Obviously, what may be good cause for one type of
examination may not be so for another. The ability of the movant
to obtain the desired information by other means is also relevant.
52
Rule 35 determinations, therefore, have been termed "intensively fact-
specific. '53 Evaluating whether a movant has satisfied the "in contro-
versy" and "good cause" requirements of Rule 35 requires the court to
scrutinize the specific facts of a lawsuit and their relation to the partic-
ular examination sought.54 In particular, proving the "in controversy"
requirement calls on the court to examine the particular facts of each
case to determine if the mental or physical condition of the party is
really at issue in the lawsuit. 55 Often, this analysis can be done simply
by reading the complaint.56 For example, when a plaintiff seeks to
recover for physical injuries, his physical condition is "in contro-
48. Id. at 18 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
49. See generally The Supreme Court, 1964 Term, 79 HARV. L. Rsv. 168, 169-70 (1965)
(discussing the two Supreme Court decisions regarding Rule 35: Sibbach v. Wilson, 312
U.S. 1 (1940) and Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104 (1964)).
50. 379 U.S. 104 (1964).
51. See id. at 117-21.
52. Id. at 118.
53. See Lahr v. Fulbright &Jaworski, 164 F.R.D. 196,199 (N.D. Tex. 1995) (examining
the specifics of the alleged sexual harassment before ordering the test).
54. See Schlagenhauf 379 U.S. at 118.
55. See id. at 119-21.
56. See id. at 119.
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versy."5 7 A similar determination is made with respect to mental exam-
inations. Courts generally require more than a "garden variety" claim
of emotional distress before ordering a plaintiff to produce mental
examination records or to undergo an independent mental examina-
tion.58 However, this analysis is fact-driven, with little or no examina-
tion of the medical or psychological procedure to be used. Similarly,
"good cause" requires a simple factual showing that there is either a
need for the examination, or that there is no less intrusive means
available for obtaining the information.
59
Only after the movants have satisfied the "in controversy" and
"good cause" requirements will a court examine the procedures to be
used to gather the evidence. While the movant may satisfy the two
factual requirements of Rule 35, the court can still limit the scope of
requested examinations or deny them altogether. 60 In exercising its
discretion, the court balances the rights of civil litigants to discover
relevant facts against the privacy interests of persons subject to
discovery.
6 1
57. See Vopelak v. Williams, 42 F.R.D. 387, 389 (N.D. Ohio 1967).
58. See Sabree v. United Bd. of Carpenters &Joiners of Am., Local No. 33, 126 F.R.D.
422, 426 (D. Mass. 1989); see alsoJansen v. Packaging Corp. of Am., 158 F.R.D. 409, 410-11
(N.D. Ill. 1994) (holding that, where plaintiff claimed she suffered "ongoing emotional
distress due to alleged sexual harassment ... by her former supervisor," defendant corpo-
ration was entitled to an examination of the plaintiff); Smedley v. Capps, 820 F. Supp.
1227, 1232 (N.D. Cal. 1993) (holding that defendant employer was entitled to compel
plaintiff to undergo a mental examination to refute her allegation that she suffered only
"normal" emotional distress).
59. See Marroni v. Matey, 82 F.R.D. 371, 372 (E.D. Pa. 1979). For state-equivalent rul-
ings, see Cody v. Marriott Corp., 103 F.R.D. 421, 422 (D. Mass. 1984); Ex parte Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc., 729 So.2d 294, 298 (Ala. 1999); Martin v. Tindell, 98 So.2d 473, 475 (Fla.
1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 959 (1958); Coates v. Whittington, 758 S.W.2d 749, 752 (Tex.
1988); Williams v. Sanderson, 904 S.W.2d 212, 214 (Tex. Ct. App. 1995); Crouch v.
Gleason, 875 S.W.2d 738, 739 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994).
60. See Stinchcomb v. United States, 132 F.R.D. 29, 30 (E.D. Pa. 1990); Hardy v. Riser,
309 F. Supp. 1234, 1241 (N.D. Miss. 1970). If, for example, the examining expert seeks to
use unreliable evaluative techniques, the court may deny the motion. See Edward D.
Cavanagh, Decision Extends Daubert Approach to All Expert Testimony, N.Y. ST. B.J., Aug. 1971,
at 9 (discussing the factors determining admissibility of scientific evidence). In Usher v.
Lakewood Engineering & Manufacturing Co., the District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois ordered a psychiatric evaluation of a plaintiff alleging sex discrimination, but re-
fused to allow the defendant to conduct a battery of psychological tests. See Usher v. Lake-
wood Engineering & Manufacturing Co., 158 F.R.D. 411, 413-14 (N.D. Ill. 1994). The
court accepted the plaintiff's demonstration of "the inadequacy of the correlation factors
and the validity factors of all" the tests at issue. Id., at 413. Thus, according to the court,
while the tests might uncover relevant evidence, the probative value of such evidence "'is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or mis-
leading the jury.'" Id. (citation omitted).
61. See Crowe v. Nivison, 145 F.R.D. 657, 658 (D.C. Md. 1993).
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Even with these seemingly stringent requirements and the courts'
broad discretion to limit examinations, courts have ordered examina-
tions in some controversial circumstances, sometimes delving into
very personal and private affairs.62 Courts commonly justify their rul-
ings by stating that the ordered testing is necessary to promote a fair
and judicious conclusion to the dispute, even though they recognize
the potentially painful or invasive effects of the testing. 63 As illustrated
by the following cases, courts are willing to order examinations that
are overly intrusive, not useful, and involve third parties. These cases
should give genetic ethicists great cause for concern, because allowing
courts to mandate certain genetic tests will intrude into parties' very
personal affairs and invade the autonomy of third parties. Further,
juries tend to give undue weight to genetic evidence.
In Lowe v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc.,64 the court did recognize
the intrusive nature of a psychological exam. 65 There, the plaintiff
filed an action against her employer for racial discrimination in failing
to promote her and for retaliating after she complained about the
discrimination. 66 She asserted that the employer's actions caused her
severe emotional and physical harm and distress for which she sought
both compensatory and punitive damages. 67 The defendant requested
a psychological exam of the plaintiff to defend against the emotional
distress claim.68 The plaintiff argued that any inquiry into her past
physical and emotional problems, as well as her past social and private
activities should be precluded unless it directly related to her job per-
formance. 69 The plaintiff further argued that allowing broad discovery
of a claimant's personal history would discourage claimants from fil-
ing meritorious actions for discrimination.7 0 The defendant con-
tended that, because plaintiff alleged defendant's conduct caused her
severe emotional and physical damage for which she sought punitive
62. See, e.g., Pettyjohn v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., No. 91-CV2681, 1992 WL
105162 (E.D. Pa. 1992) (holding that defendants in a personal injury suit were entitled to a
compelled HIV blood test of plaintiff because plaintiff had placed his life expectancy in
controversy by seeking future damages).
63. See generally Kording & DuMontelle, supra note 34, at 692-94 (discussing the dis-
covery of genetic testing and the courts' willingness to order these tests without explaining
the reasons for their rulings).
64. 101 F.R.D. 296 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
65. Id. at 298.
66. See id.
67. See id. at 298.
68. See id. at 298-99.
69. See id. at 298.
70. See id.
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and compensatory damages, her life history should be subject to in-
quiry through a mental and physical examination. 71 The defendant
maintained that the claimed physical and mental suffering were the
result of a culmination of the plaintiffs history of medical and psycho-
logical problems, and were not the result of any activities by
defendant. 72  1.
The court granted defendant's request to have a psychiatrist ex-
plore the plaintiffs "entire life history," including her marital life and
private activities. 73 The court reasoned that, as long as plaintiff sought
compensatory and punitive damages for her alleged physical, mental
or emotional harm, the defendant was entitled to inquire about her
entire life history, even through a mental or physical examination.
74
Courts have even ordered examinations of non-party witnesses
for issues unrelated to the facts of the lawsuit. In Lewin v. Jackson,7 5 the
court did not apply Rule 35, but used the spirit of the rule to order a
mental and physical examination of a non-party elderly man in order
to determine whether he was competent to testify at a deposition.
7 6
The lawsuit concerned a slander claim in which the plaintiff argued
that the defendants, by defaming her, had induced her wealthy father
to disinherit her.77 The defendants wanted to depose the plaintiffs
father and plaintiff claimed that he was not fit to testify. 78 The plaintiff
alleged "that a deposition would subject the elderly man, in his feeble
state, to an undue burden so severe it could threaten his life."' 79 The
Arizona Supreme Court noted that the examination was not for dis-
71. See id.
72. See id.
73. See id. at 299.
74. See id. at 298-99. But see Vinson v. Superior Court, 239 Cal. Rptr. 292 (1987). In
Vinson, the plaintiff alleged that harassment by an interviewer for whom she eventually
worked caused continuing emotional distress, loss of sleep, anxiety, mental anguish, humil-
iation, and reduced self-esteem, for which she sought compensation under state tort law.
See id. at 296. Interpreting a California procedural rule similar to Rule 35, the court held
that plaintiff's claims of "various mental and emotional ailments" placed her mental state
in controversy, but the court restricted the order granting a medical examination in two
respects. See id at 297. First, it restricted the scope of the examination, holding that the
plaintiff's right to privacy precluded the defendant from exploring her sexual history and
practices. See id. at 298. Second, the court stated in dicta that it would not order an exami-
nation in a "simple sexual harassment claim asking compensation for having to endure an
oppressive work environment" where the complainant did not seek monetary damages for
ongoing psychological injuries. Id. at 297.
75. 492 P.2d 406 (Ariz. 1972).
76. See Lewin, 492 P.2d at 408-10.
77. See id. at 407.
78. See id.
79. Id.
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covery purposes and thus Rule 35 did not apply. 80 However, the court
had inherent power to "take all steps necessary to assure itself not only
that a witness's testimony will be accurate ... but also that the act of
testifying will not endanger the health of the proposed witness."81 The
court held that, under the circumstances, because the court's purpose
was to make sure the father was competent to be deposed, the exami-
nation was acceptable.
82
Courts have used Rule 35 to order tests that are inexact in their
results and are open to several interpretations. In several cases courts
have granted defendants' Rule 35 motions to conduct intelligence
quotient ("IQ") testing of plaintiffs' mothers and siblings in lead ex-
posure tort litigation.83 In one lead exposure case, the court granted
defendant's motion to compel IQ testing of the plaintiff's mother,
and ordered the release of academic records of the plaintiffs family.84
As is typical of Rule 35 cases, in each of these lawsuits the court
focused on the particular facts of the case and the need for the exami-
nation while avoiding any discussion of the particular examination to
be used. The courts' failure to discuss the procedures to be used in
these cases is logical given the general acceptance of psychological,
competency, and IQ tests. Genetic tests, however, are not as widely
accepted or understood. Because courts and juries may not fully un-
derstand that genetic test results have a number of possible interpreta-
tions, they may incorrectly perceive the tests to be accurate and
80. See id. at 409.
81. Id.
82. See id. at 408-09.
83. See Salkey v. Mott, 656 N.Y.S.2d 886, 887 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997); see alsoJennifer
Wriggins, Genetics, IQ, Determinism, and Torts: The Example of Discovery in Lead Exposure Litiga-
tion, 77 B.U. L. REV. 1025, 1042 (1997) (discussing Campbell v. Bonner, No. 92-7771, at 3-4
(D.C. Super. Ct. Jan. 7, 1994)).
84. See Wriggins, supra note 83, at 1059 n.159 (discussing Atkins v. New York City Hous.
Auth., No. 12460195 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Oct. 1996)). For a discussion of the reliability and
validity of IQ tests, see David Bellinger & Herbert L. Needleman, Neurodevelopmental Effects
of Low-Level Lead Exposure in Children, in HUMAN LEAD EXPOSURE 191, 195 (1992) ("A global
measure, such as an intelligence test, may not be the most valid or sensitive measure of the
quality, efficiency, or flexibility of a child's cognition or of any effects lead may have on
it."); see also Larry P. v. Riles, 495 F. Supp. 926, 935-59 (N.D. Cal. 1979) (recounting the
discriminatory history of the development and use of IQ tests in California); Wriggins,
supra note 83, at 1044-55 (discussing the accuracy and implications of IQ testing gener-
ally). See generally RICHARD J. HERRNSTEIN & CHARLES MURRAY, THE BELL CURVE: INTELLI-
GENCE AND CLASS STRUCTURE IN AMERICAN LIFE (1994) (analyzing intelligence testing data
and discussing the correlation between scores on the Armed Forces Qualifying Test and
educational level, income, anti-social behavior, and ethnic background); THOMAS SOWELL,
RACE AND CULTURE 157-58 (1994) (describing international differences in intelligence test
performance).
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determinative scientific tools. Of the few opinions that have addressed
court-ordered genetic testing under Rule 35, none have discussed the
specifics of the tests, which makes it difficult to determine whether
courts truly appreciate the numerous issues associated with such tests.
II. Understanding Genetic Testing and Its Use in Rule 35
Examinations
A Kansas state court was one of the first to order a genetic test in
a civil lawsuit. In Bennett v. Fieser,85 the court ordered genetic testing of
a minor child in a medical malpractice action.8 6 Although the court
focused on the physical intrusiveness of the procedure,8 7 the court
failed to reference the purpose of the test or the possible mental in-
trusiveness of the examination. The court seemed more interested in
the minor physical intrusion caused by a blood test, and did not dis-
cuss the social or psychological implications of the test. It ordered the
test because the amount of blood sought was relatively small, the pain
from the test was minimal, and the apparent relevance was
significant.
88
Likewise, in Dodd-Anderson v. Stevens,89 the same Kansas state
court ordered genetic testing of a child in a medical malpractice ac-
tion in which the plaintiffs alleged that the minor child suffered a
brain injury during delivery. 90 The defendants sought a sample of the
child's blood for genetic testing.9' They also asked to have the child
examined by a pediatric neurologist, a pediatric psychiatrist, and a
geneticist.92 In granting the orders for genetic testing and independ-
ent medical exams, the court reasoned that the relevance of testing
outweighed the pain and invasive nature of the exams, even for a
child.93
Both of these decisions failed to account for any possible privacy
issues or psychological risks associated with the blood tests. The cur-
sory treatment of the genetic testing issue in both cases makes it diffi-
85. No. 93-1004-MLB, 1994 WL 542089, at *1 (D. Kan. 1994).
86. See Bennett, 1994 WL 542089, at *2.
87. See id. at *2.
88. See id. (focusing on the "potential relevance of such testing and the nature and
amount of damages sought by plaintiff').
89. Nos. 92-1015-MLB, 92-1016-MLB, 1993 WL 273373, at *1 (D. Kan. 1993).
90. See Dodd-Anderson, 1993 WL 273373, at *1-*3.
91. See id. at *1.
92. See id.
93. See id.
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cult to determine if any privacy issues or risks were factored into the
decisions to order the tests.
In a more recent unreported decision, a California court applied
its Rule 35 equivalent when ordering genetic testing.94 The plaintiff
sued the manufacturer of chemicals to which her son was exposed
during her pregnancy, claiming that the exposure caused her child's
mental retardation. 95 The defendant sought a genetic test of the boy,
claiming that the birth defects were not caused by the chemicals, but
by a genetic condition called Fragile X Syndrome. 96 The court
granted the order based on the fact that the child exhibited some
similar traits to children with Fragile X Syndrome, though he lacked
some other common characteristics. 97
These three decisions illustrate how courts can and will order ge-
netic testing under Rule 35. The orders in these cases focus on the
facts of the lawsuit. They provide no discussion of the specifics of the
medical procedures, the usefulness of the tests to the litigation, or the
possible ramifications of ordering these tests. The cases highlight how
courts are likely to confine themselves to a simple analysis of.,the
"good cause" and "in controversy" requirements. 98 Before a court or-
ders a genetic test it must understand the types of genetic testing avail-
able, the actual mechanics of the tests, and what type of information is
produced by the test.
A. Testing for Genetically-Based Diseases
Genetic testing became possible when, in 1990, scientists began
deciphering the human genome as part of a colossal project named
the Human Genome Project ("Project"). 99 When completed, the Pro-
94. See Lehrman, supra note 31, at Al (describing Severson v. KTI Chemicals, Inc.).
95. See id.
96. See id. For a discussion of Fragile X, see Tanya Gregory, Meeting the Challenge of
Fragile X Syndrome, PATIENT CARE, Sept. 15, 1997, available in 1997 WL 25779124. Fragile X
Syndrome is the most common cause of inherited mental retardation. See id. It is caused by
a mutation on the FMR-l gene. See id. Since this is an abnormality of a sex chromosome,
which can be transmitted from parent to child, the term "sex-linked" or "X-linked" inheri-
tance is used in the medical literature. See Bill McMenemy, Facing Huntington's Disease: A
Handbook for Families and Friends, at ch. 2 (visitedJan. 21, 2000) <http://neuro-chief-e.mgh.
harvard.edu/mcmenemy/facinghd.html#contents>. Current estimates of its prevalence
vary, but some experts believe that Fragile X affects at least one in 1000 males and females.
See Raymond Kammer, Implications of Genetic Testing, CONG. TESTIMONY BY FED. DOCUMENT
CLEARING HOUSE, Apr. 21, 1999, available in 1999 WL 16946490. More conservative esti-
mates put its frequency at one in 1500 males and one in 2500 females. See Gregory, supra.
97. See Lehrman, supra note 31, at Al (describing Severson v. KTI Chemicals, Inc.).
98. See infra Part I.C.
99. See Hood & Rowen, supra note 11, at 3.
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ject will change the way science and medicine deal with health care. A
map of the human genome will eventually allow accurate diagnostic
tools and potential cures and treatments to be developed for many
inherited diseases:' 00 A number of diagnostic tests already exist for
certain genetically-related diseases. 10 1 The task force that drafted the
Genetic Privacy Act' 0 2 likened genetic testing to a "future diary.
' 103
They consider the human genome a coded future diary, and a genetic
test as a way of decoding that diary.
104
1. What Does a Positive Test Result Mean? A Wide Variance of
Information
The decoding of this genetic diary is not yet an exact science. The
deciphering of a person's genome will have a significant impact on
the person's life, both mentally and physically; however, the informa-
tion gained may not always be definitive or accurate. A positive test
result will most often predict only a susceptibility to the particular dis-
ease or condition. 105 Further, different genetic tests can produce a
wide variance of information and there may be no clear explanation
of what the results really mean.' 0 6 For example, some positive results
mean that a person has anywhere from a twenty to an eighty percent
chance of getting a particular disease, and some negative results do
not guarantee that the person is free from developing symptoms of a
disease.1
07
The statistical probability of developing a disease is not the only
variance associated with genetic testing. The information produced by
a genetic test varies according to the accuracy of the test, the reliability
of the test, the severity of the disease, and the impact of environmen-
tal factors.' 08 Also, many genetic disorders-those referred to as poly-
genetic disorders-are caused by more than a single gene.109 Even as
100. See Rothstein & Hoffman, supra note 12, at 854.
101. See id.
102. See ANNAS ET AL., THE GENETIC PRIVACY ACT, supra note 33.
103. George J. Annas et al., Drafting the Genetic Privacy Act: Science, Policy, and Practical
Considerations, 23J. LAw, MED. & ETHICS 360, 360 (1995) [hereinafter Annas et al., Drafting
the Genetic Privacy Act].
104. See Patricia Roche et al., The Genetic Privacy Act: A Proposal for National Legislation, 37
JURIMETRICSJ. 1, 3 (1996).
105. See infra Part II.B.
106. See infra Part II.B.
107. See infra Part II.B.
108. See Rothstein & Hoffman, supra note 12, at 856.
109. See ASSESSING GENETIC RisKS: IMPLICATIONS FOR HEALTH AND SOCIAL POLICY 95
(1994).
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the Project continues, genetic mutations are being discovered and
linked to existing diseases.110 Until all mutations are discovered, it will
be difficult to assess the reliability of any given test' I because testing
for one genetic mutation provides less accurate predictions of diseases
that will later be deemed polygenetic.
2. Environmental Factors
The most critical factor in these informational variances is the
impact of the environment. Often, an individual's habits, how well she
takes care of her health, her exposure to workplace toxins, or other
environmental factors will determine the severity of a particular ge-
netic disorder. 12 As the Project has progressed, it has become increas-
ingly clear that many genetic disorders have an environmental
component.113 This means that a test may only uncover a susceptibility
to a particular disease without indicating when symptoms may begin,
what the severity of those symptoms may be, or how long a person is
likely to live.
Great strides are being made in testing for a person's pre-disposi-
tion to a genetic disease, but this information is often not useful to the
patient and can, in fact, be harmful. Although the first diseases linked
to gene mutations, Huntington's Disease ("HD") and Cystic Fibrosis
("CF"), are accurate predictors, 114 they do not provide the patient
with helpful information because there are no significant cures or
treatments available for the diseases." 5 While scientists have been
110. See id.
111. See id. at 94-99.
112. Some diseases are influenced jointly by both a genetic defect and environmental
factors. Heart disease is one example. See id. at 95. Scientists have discovered a gene that
predisposes individuals to arteriosclerosis, the leading cause of heart disease in this coun-
try. See Coronary Heart Disease: Important Cardiovascular Disease Gene Discovered, GENE THERAPY
WKv, Mar. 23, 1998, at 30. The disease is linked to a single gene called ATHS. See id.
Scientists call ATHS a classical susceptibility gene in that it does not cause arteriosclerosis
by itself, but works with other factors, such as diet and possibly other genes, to put those
individuals who carry it at greater risk. See id.
113. See ASSESSING GENETIC RIsKs, supra note 109, at 62.
114. See GregoryJ. Meissen, Ph.D. et al., Predictive Testing for Huntington's Disease with Use
of a Linked DNA Marker, 318 NEW ENG. J. MED. 535, 535 (1988); Bat-sheva Kerem et al.,
Identification of the Cystic Fibrosis Gene: Genetic Analysis, 245 Sci. 1073, 1079. Genes are inher-
ited in pairs, with one gene coming from each parent to make the pair. See Kerem et al.,
supra, at 1073. Cystic Fibrosis occurs when both genes in the pair have a mutation. See id. A
person with Cystic Fibrosis receives one CF gene from each parent. See id. at 1075. The
parents of a child with CF each "carry" one non-working copy of the gene and one working
copy of the gene. See id. The parents are called CF carriers, and because they have one
working gene but they have no symptoms. See id. at 1079.
115. See Meissen et al., supra note 114, at 541.
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able to locate genes that cause or influence different diseases, and
they can often manufacture a test for the disease quickly after locating
its genetic basis,1 16 treatments or cures for these diseases are not de-
veloped as quickly. There is often a large gap between the time a test
is developed and when treatments are discovered.' 17 Scientifically,
these genetic pre-disposition tests represent a clear medical break-
through, but to the many individuals with these genetic defects, these
extraordinary findings are meaningless and often psychologically
harmful.1 18 The results only give a person some insight into his or her
future doom, while offering no hope for possible treatments or cures.
For such diseases, the test results can simply be a death sentence, of
which many individuals would prefer not to be made aware." 9
B. Examples of Genetically-Based Diseases
Three genetically-related diseases that illustrate the wide variance
in genetic test results are Huntington's Disease, Alzheimer's Disease,
and breast cancer associated with the gene mutation BRCA1. These
three diseases best illustrate the breadth of the technology available,
its limitations, and the lack of cures or treatments available.
A positive test result in each of these three illnesses means drasti-
cally different things, allowing for a wide range of interpretations. A
positive result for one disease may only mean that the individual has a
fifty percent chance of developing the disease, while another test will
show a ninety percent susceptibility. The tests that check for the
probability of developing the disease, however, fail to account for
when or to what degree of severity the symptoms will occur. Each test
differs as to predictability and reliability. The diseases themselves dif-
fer in severity and in the availability of treatments for the disease.
Without knowing these variables, courts cannot make proper assess-
ments as to the value of the tests and the informational risks that may
be associated with the results.
1. Huntington's Disease
HD is neurodegenerative; it is a progressive condition that results
from increasing damage to the nervous system.1 20 HD generally devel-
116. See Rothstein & Hoffman, supra note 12, at 856.
117. See id.
118. See infra Part W.A.
119. See infta Part W.A.
120. See Gayle P. Andresen, Dx Dementia: But What Kind? RN, June 1, 1998, at 27.
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ops subtly during a person's thirties or forties with the following symp-
toms: movement disorders, dementia, and psychiatric disturbances.'
2 1
The course of the disease may last anywhere from ten to thirty
years (onset to death), 122 and can be divided into three stages. In the
early period, patients can still perform most of their usual activities.
123
They may still be able to work and drive.' 2 4 Involuntary movements
are mild and infrequent, speech is still clear, and dementia, if present
at all, is mild. 125 In the middle stage, affected patients become more
disabled and need assistance with some of their daily activities. 126 Fall-
ing, weight loss, and swallowing difficulties may become problem-
atic. 127 Dementia becomes more obvious to the casual observer 128 and
involuntary movements are more pronounced. 129 In the late stage, pa-
tients require almost full-time care and may need to reside in hospitals
or nursing homes. 13 0 When death comes it is usually caused by
pneumonia. '31
HD is caused by a mutation in a gene located on chromosome
4.132 This gene is found in every human being and contains a section
where the same three molecules repeat several times (a "triplet repeat
sequence"). 13 3 In the case of HD, the gene contains an abnormally
large number of triplet repeats.'
3 4
Genes for diseases can be either dominant, meaning that one
need only inherit the gene from one parent to get the disease, or
recessive, meaning that one must get the gene from both sides of the
family to have the disease. 135 The gene for HD is dominant. 36 There-
fore, most HD sufferers have one expanded gene and one normal
gene. 37 Because a parent can pass either the expanded gene or the
121. See id.









131. See id. at ch. 2.
132. See id.
133. See Ewout Brunt, In Dominant Ataxias, GENERATIONS, Mar. 22, 1999, available in
1999 WL 22869252.
134. See id.




normal gene, each child has a fifty percent chance of getting the ex-
panded copy and of inheriting the disease. 138 It is important to under-
stand that people born with the mutated gene for HD will not develop
the symptoms until later in life. 139 Therefore, someone can carry the
expanded gene but not yet exhibit symptoms.' 40 Such a person is said
to be presymptomatic.1U
Since the discovery of the HD gene in 1993, a predictive test has
been developed. 142 This test can identify the carriers of the faulty
gene before they develop the illness.143 "Occasionally, the result falls
in a 'grey area' where it is still uncertain whether the person will de-
velop HD or not. 1 44 Even when the test does show that someone car-
ries the faulty gene, it does not show when the disease will start to
develop.
145
There is presently no cure for HD nor are there any direct treat-
ments, although researchers are working on a number of treatments
that may slow down the progression of the disease. 146 However, there
are a great many interventions available today which can make life
better for HD sufferers.1 47 In the early and middle stages of the dis-
ease, medications called neuroleptics, given in larger doses for psychi-
atric complaints, can be given in small doses to HD patients to
suppress involuntary movements.' 48 Depression and other psychiatric
conditions in people with HD, the result of damage to the brain, can
be debilitating but can be effectively treated.1 49 Proper nutrition, ex-
ercise, and precautions in the home can prevent weight loss, falls, and
138. See id.
139. See Wendy C. McKinnon et al., Predisposition Genetic Testingfor Late-Onset Disorders in
Adults, A Position Paper of the National Society of Genetic Counselors, 278 JAMA 1217, 1217
(1997).
140. See id. at 1218.
141. See id.
142. See Sandi Wiggins, M.Sc. et al., The Psychological Consequences of Predictive Testing for
Huntington's Disease, 327 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1401, 1401-05 (1992).
143. See id. at 1401.
144. McMenemy, supra note 96, at ch. 2.
145. See Wiggins et al., supra note 142, at 1401.
146. See Facts and Myths Regarding Huntington's Disease, BROWN U. LONc-TERM CARE
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choking on food.150 Recently, scientists have concluded research,
which may lead to additional treatment for sufferers of HD.
151
2. Alzheimer's Disease
Of the diseases that produce dementia, Alzheimer's is the most
common.1 52  More than four million older Americans have
Alzheimer's, and that number is expected to triple in the next twenty
years as more people live into their eighties and nineties. 153 In 1906,
Dr. Alois Alzheimer noticed changes in the brain tissue of a woman
who had died of an unusual mental illness. 154 He found abnormal
clumps and tangled bundles of fibers in her brain tissue. 15 5 The dis-
ease, which came to be known as Alzheimer's, progresses to affect lan-
guage, reasoning, understanding, reading, and writing.156 Eventually,
people with Alzheimer's Disease may become anxious or aggressive
and may even wander from home.
57
The predictive value of the test for Alzheimer's disease is quite
low. 158 Considerable evidence suggests that the presence of the gene
for "apolipoprotein E-e4" increases a person's risk for Alzheimer's. 159
The gene for apolipoprotein E ("APOE") is located on chromosome
150. See id.
151. See John Travis, Thwarting Killer Enzymes of the Brain (Research of Caspases in the
Brain), 155 Sci. NEws 351 (1999) (discussing new studies in mice which indicate that block-
ing an enzyme involved in cell death pathways delays the onset of symptoms and death in a
mouse model of HD, offering a rare ray of hope for sufferers of this uniformly fatal neuro-
logical disease). Caspase-1, an enzyme involved in controlling cell death, was activated in
the brains of mice and humans with HD. See id. The researchers crossed mice having a
portion of the human HD gene with mice deficient in normal Caspase-1 to see whether
they could affect the course of a HD-like disease. See id. Disease onset and mortality were
significantly delayed in the resulting mice, the investigators reported. See id These mice
also lived longer than the mice carrying only the HD gene fragment. See id. To further test
their theory, the scientists injected an inhibitor of Caspase-1 into the brains of HD gene
mice. See id. When this drug was infused, the mice suffered less disability and lived longer
than untreated mice. See id.
152. See Kara Albisu, As a Millennium Ends, Alzheimer Care Begins, NURSING HOMES, Dec.
1, 1999, at 98, available in 1999 WL 12019512.
153. See id.
154. See Key to Alzheimer's Located in Brain, CURRENT Sci., Jan. 7, 2000, at 14.
155. See id.
156. See Myron F. Weiner, Alzheimers Disease Update: Using What We Now Know to Help
Patients, CONSULTANT, Mar. 1, 1999, available in 1999 WL 13774866.
157. See id.
158. SeeJim Edwardson & Chris Morris, The Genetics of Alzheimer's Disease: The Number of
Genetic Risk Factors Associated with This Disorder is Increasing Steadily, BRIT. MED. J., Aug. 8,
1998, at 361, available in 1998 WL 13306263.
159. See Weiner, supra note 156.
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19.160 Several recent studies show that its natural variations correlate
well with the risk of Alzheimer's disease.
16'
The APOE gene comes in three varieties of alleles: e2, e3, and
e4.162 Everyone's APOE gene has two of these three alleles, so there
are six possible combinations in any individual's DNA.163 The e2 allele
is associated with decreased risk of Alzheimer's disease. 164 The e3 al-
lele is associated with average risk.165 One e4 allele approximately
doubles the risk of suffering from Alzheimer's, while two e4 alleles
boosts the risk eight-to-ten-fold.
166
Genetic testing for APOE alleles is currently possible, but it is not
widely used because it has little predictive value. 167 Despite the in-
creased risk with the existence of two e4 APOE alleles, many people
with these two alleles live into old age with no sign of Alzheimer's. 168
Currently, genetic testing for APOE alleles only suggests an increased
risk; it does not predict development of Alzheimer's. 169
There are, as yet, no cures, but researchers studying Alzheimer's
have made progress, especially in the last five years.' 70 New drugs that
can temporarily improve mental abilities in some people with mild
Alzheimer's are now available, and more drugs are being studied.' 7'
These therapies appear to slow the progression of the disease some-
what. 172 In addition, there is a growing number of medications reach-
ing the clinical trial phase.' 73 Although by definition these are not yet
proven to be effective, they offer added possibilities for treatment. 74
160. See id.
161. See National Institute on Aging/Alzheimer's Association Working Group, Apoli-
poprotein E Genotyping in Alzheimer's Disease, 347 LANCET 1091, 1091 (1996).
162. See id.
163. See id.
164. See id. at 1092.
165. See id.
166. See id.
167. See Special Report: Genomics and Diagnostics: A Little Now, More Later, GENESIS REPORT,
Nov. 1, 1997, available in 1997 WL11413177.
168. See National Institute on Aging/Alzheimer's Association Working Group, supra
note 161, at 1092.
169. See id.
170. See Albisu, supra note 152.
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3. Breast Cancer
The American Cancer Society has estimated that in the United
States in 1999 over 176,300 women would be diagnosed with breast
cancer and nearly 44,000 would die from this disease. 175 Breast cancer
accounts for thirty-two percent of all cancers in American women;
eight percent of all women will develop breast cancer sometime dur-
ing her life. 176 Although earlier detection results in higher cure rates,
breast cancer remains the leading cause of cancer death of adult wo-
men under fifty-four years of age and the second most common cause
after age fifty-four. 177 Among women of all ages, breast cancer is sec-
ond only to lung cancer as the leading cause of cancer deaths in wo-
men.178 Hereditary breast cancer makes up approximately ten to
fifteen percent of all breast cancer cases.
179
In recent years, gene alterations have been found in some fami-
lies with a history of breast cancer.1 80 Many women in these families
also have had ovarian cancer. 181 These alterations are most often
found in genes named BRCA1 and BRCA2. 18 2 Both men and women
have BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes, so alterations in these genes can be
passed down from either the mother or the father.
83
Genetic testing for breast and ovarian cancer risk involves looking
for altered genes such as BRCA1 and BRCA2.' 84 Testing for breast
cancer risk, however, will not give you a simple "yes" or "no" an-
swer.' 85 Finding a gene alteration in BRCA1 or BRCA2 indicates an
increased risk of developing cancer, but it will not indicate if or when
cancer will develop.' 86 There are several factors involved in calculat-
ing the chance of finding a BRCA1 or BRCA2 alteration, also called
175. See S. Vincent Rajkumar & Lynn C. Hartmann, Screening Mammography in Women
Aged 40-49 Years (for Breast Cancer), 78 MED. 410 (1999), available in 1999 WL 13259068.
176. See Thomas C. Rosenthal, M.D. & Stirling M. Puck, M.D. Screening for Genetic Risk of
Breast Cancer, 59 Am. FAM. PHYSICIAN 99, 99 (1999).
177. See Rajkumar & Hartman supra note 175.
178. See id.
179. See Rosenthal & Puck, supra note 176, at 99.
180. See GenRISK Testing Program Offers Patients Hope in Confronting Disease, GENE THER-
APY WKLY, Mar. 2, 1999, available in 1999 WL 11598221.
181. See id.
182. See id. (BRCAI and BRCA2 stand for BReast CAncer Gene I and BReast CAncer
Gene 2).
183. See id.
184. See Charles W. Henderson, Testing Program Offers Patients New Hope in Confronting





the "prior probability" of finding a mutation.'8 7 The only way to deter-
mine the prior probability is to take a detailed family history.' 88 The
family history must include all cancer diagnoses, not just breast and
ovarian cancer, as well as the ages at diagnosis and the patient's
ethnicity.'
89
Perhaps the most important thing that women should know
before testing for BRCA1 or BRCA2, the mutated genes, is that a posi-
tive test does not mean a patient will definitely develop cancer. 190 Most
articles in the medical literature about BRCA1 and BRCA2 tests say
that the risk of actually developing breast cancer with a positive ge-
netic test is eighty-five percent.' 91 There is, however, recent evidence
that this risk figure may actually be much lower in individuals who do
not have a very strong family history of cancer. 1
92
An individual at increased risk for breast or ovarian cancer can
make choices that may help reduce her risk of developing cancer or
help her in detecting the disease at an early stage. 193 An individual at
increased risk may choose to be monitored more closely for any sign
of cancer.' 94 This may include more frequent mammograms, breast
exams by a doctor, breast self-exams, and an ultrasound exam of the
ovaries. 195 An individual at increased risk may choose to have her
healthy breasts removed.' 96 A recent study has suggested that the re-
moval of the ovaries decreases the chance of getting breast cancer for
women who carry the BRCA1 mutation.
19v
III. Court-Ordered HIV Testing and Its Implications for
Genetic Testing Under Rule 35
Huntington's Disease, Alzheimer's Disease, and breast cancer
often lead to death, usually in a very slow and sometimes painful man-
187. See Elizabeth B. Claus et al., Effect of BRCA1 and BRCA2 on the Association Between
Breast Cancer Risk and Family History, 90J. NAT'L CANCER INST. 1824, 1824 (1998).
188. See id. at 1827-28.
189. See id.
190. See Wylie Burke, M.D., Ph.D. et al., BRCA1 and BRCA2: A Small Part of the Puzzle, 91
J. NAT'L CANCER INST. 904 (1999).
191. See id.
192. See id.
193. See Ellen Michaud, Outsmart Your "Bad" Genes, PREVENTION, Apr., 1999, at 122,
130-31.
194. See id. at 127.
195. See id.
196. See id. at 198.
197. See Timothy R. Rebbeck et al., Breast Cancer Risk After Bilateral Prophylactic Oophorec-
tomy in BRCA 1 Mutation Carriers, 91 J. NAT'L CANCER INST. 1475, 1475 (1999).
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ner.'0 8 A positive test result for one of these diseases at the presympto-
matic stage often tells the person that he or she is likely to develop
symptoms later in life and eventually die prematurely, with little or
nothing the person can do to stop the inevitable. 199 Because of the
potentially traumatic nature of the information generated by genetic
tests, 200 they bear a striking resemblance to HIV tests. The issues cen-
tral to debates concerning HIV testing-such as discrimination, psy-
chological trauma, and stigmatization-will reverberate in discussions
surrounding genetic testing.
201
A. Cases of Court-Ordered HIV Testing
While public health officials and civil libertarians were debating
how best to treat information concerning a person's HIV status, a
number of courts have been confronted with similar informational
privacy issues. 202 Courts have had to consider issues surrounding the
discovery of medical records that contain confidential HIV informa-
tion, 20 3 whether a doctor must divulge his HIV status,20 4 and whether
198. See supra Part I1.B.
199. See supra Part II.B.
200. See Lawrence 0. Gostin, Health Information Privacy, 80 CORNE.LL L. REv. 451, 490
(1995) [hereinafter Gostin, Health Information Privacy].
201. See id.
202. See id. at 495-98 (providing an in-depth discussion of the privacy rights of individ-
uals in disclosing various personal documents including health care records).
203. See Woods v. White, 689 F. Supp. 874, 875 (W.D. Wis. 1988) (extending the consti-
tutional right to privacy to disclosure of a prisoner's HIV status by prison medical service
personnel and holding that giving chaplains open access to patient medical records vio-
lated privacy rights of patients), affd, 899 F.2d 17 (7th Cir. 1990).
204. See, e.g., Estate of Behringer v. Medical Ctr., 592 A.2d 1251, 1276-77 (N.J. Super.
Ct. Law Div. 1991) (mandating disclosure of a doctor's HIV-positive status to patients as
part of informed consent); see also Jane H. Barney, A Health Care Worker's Duty to Undergo
Routine Testing for HIV/AIDS and to Disclose Positive Results to Patients, 52 LA. L. REv. 933,
956-60 (1992) (advocating a duty of health care workers to submit to routine HIV testing
and to disclose a positive status to their patients); Michelle Wilcox DeBarge, The Perform-
ance of Invasive Procedures by HIV-Infected Doctors: The Duty to Disclose Under the Informed Consent
Doctrine, 25 CONN. L. REv. 991, 992-93, 1007-11 (1993) (advocating that the Behringer court
was correct in its determination that a doctor must disclose a positive HIV status whenever
there is a material risk of doctor-to-patient HIV transmission and concluding that the Behr-
inger court was correct in holding that the performance of surgical or invasive procedures
by an HIV-infected doctor poses a material risk of HIV infection to the patient). For fur-
ther discussions of doctors' and healthcare workers' obligation to disclose a positive HIV
status, see Theodore R. LeBlang, Obligations of HIV-Infected Health Professionals to Inform Pa-
tients of Their Serological Status: Evolving Theories of Liability, 27 J. MARSHALL L. RhV. 317, 319
(1994); Mary K. Logan, Whos Afraid of Whom? Courts Require H1Vdnfected Doctors to Obtain
Informed Consent of Patients, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 483, 510-11 (1995); Phillip L. McIntosh,
When the Surgeon Has HIV: What to Tell Patients About the Risk of Exposure and the Risk of
Transmission, 44 U. KAN. L. REv. 315, 316-19, 326-27 (1996).
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a party must submit to an HIV test under Rule 35. 205 When con-
fronted with these discovery issues, particularly in motions for court-
ordered HIV testing, courts have come to different conclusions de-
pending upon the focus of their reasoning. More specifically, when
faced with a motion to compel HIV testing, courts have been reluctant
to order the test when they focus their analysis on the specific facts of
HIV infection and the effects of the test. Those courts that focus on
the facts of the case and on satisfying the "in controversy" require-
ment of Rule 35, rather than the effects of the test, have been more
willing to order the test. Compelled HIV testing has occurred in sev-
eral different circumstances, ranging from child custody issues to
claims for future damages. The most far-reaching attempt to compel a
plaintiff to undergo an HIV test has been to prove future damage
claims by focusing on the tort claimant's life expectancy.
1. HIV Testing to Reduce the Amount of Future Damages
Generally in these compelled HIV testing cases, the defendant
may try to determine the H1V status of the plaintiff to ultimately re-
duce the amount of damages for future wages. 206 The defendant seeks
a reduction of damages based on the theory that, if the plaintiff is
HIV-positive, the plaintiffs life expectancy will be dramatically shorter
than that of a person not infected with the virus.207 The defendant
205. See Ugo Colella, HIV-Related Information and the Tension Between Confidentiality and
Liberal Discovery, 16J. LEGAL MED. 33, 69 (1995).
206. See Sacramona v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 152 F.R.D. 428, 430 (D. Mass.
1993); Pettyjohn v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., No. 91-CV-2681, 1992 WL 105162, at *1
(E.D. Pa., Apr. 29, 1992)).
207. See Sacramona, 152 F.R.D. at 430-31; see generally Mark A. Rothstein, Preventing the
Discovery of Plaintiff Genetic Profiles by Defendants Seeking to Limit Damages in Personal Injury
Litigation, 71 IND. L.J. 877 (1996) [hereinafter Rothstein, Preventing the Discovery]. Rothstein
discusses how,
[u] nder the prevailing American rule, a tort victim suing for damages for perma-
nent injuries is permitted to base his recovery 'on his prospective earnings for the
balance of his life expectancy at the time of his injury undiminished by any short-
ening of that expectancy as a result of the injury.'
Id. at 884 (quoting Sea-Land Servs., Inc. v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573, 594 (1974) (emphasis
omitted) (quoting 2 FOWLER V. HARPER & FLEMING JAMES, JR., THE LAW OF TORTS § 24.6, at
1293-94 (1956))). "[R]ate of earning .... is based on the plaintiff's abilities, training,
experience, and pre-injury earnings. Prospects for wage increases and loss of fringe bene-
fits also are considered." Id.
[D]etermining life expectancy[ ] is already more difficult, and it is likely to be-
come increasingly complicated in the new era of genetics and predictive
medicine. Currently, life expectancy is based initially on standard mortality tables.
These tables, however, are merely the starting point for making a determination
of life expectancy or work expectancy. '[S]uch evidence is not conclusive but
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argues that, by making a claim for future lost wages, the plaintiff
places his life expectancy at issue.20 8 This may become an issue when
the defendant learns through discovery that the plaintiff was a former
drug user, shared hypodermic needles with people, or engaged in un-
protected sex. 20 9 Arguing that the plaintiff placed his life expectancy
in controversy and that the plaintiff engaged in activity that placed
him at risk of contracting HIV, the defendant files a Rule 35 motion
seeking to compel the plaintiff to undergo HIV testing. 210 One federal
court rejected this argument by recognizing that the test would be an
"extraordinary measure" and would have little relevance to the law-
suit.2 11 The court found the relevance of the results to be so attenu-
ated from the plaintiff's personal injury cause of action that ordering
the test would allow the defendant to engage in a fishing
expedition. 21
2
In a decision that has produced much contention among legal
scholars, a federal court in Pennsylvania reached the opposite result
in Pettyjohn v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. 213 The plaintiff was a
mechanic injured while working on a truck rim. 214 Explaining that the
plaintiff placed his life expectancy in controversy by seeking future
damages, the court ordered the plaintiff to undergo an H1V blood
test, and further ordered him to forego his claims for loss of future
wages, loss of earning capacity, and future medical expenses if he did
not submit to HIV testing within five days. 215 Without any further ex-
planation, the court ordered the plaintiff to undergo HIV testing.216
Extending this rule further, the same district court held in a sepa-
rate lawsuit that a defendant could discover any medical records re-
lated to the plaintiffs HIV status because plaintiff sought future
damages. 21 7 As in Pettyjohn, the defendant wanted the information to
more accurately measure the amount of future damages the plaintiff
merely an aid to assist [the jury] in determining the present value of any future
damages determined to be due .... '
See id. at 884-85 (quoting Brodie v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 203 A.2d 657, 660 (Pa.
1964)).
208. See Sacramona, 152 F.R.D. at 431.
209. See id. at 430.
210. See id.
211. See id. at 431.
212. See id.
213. No. 91-CV-2681, 1992 WL 105162, at *1 (E.D. Pa. 1992).
214. See id.
215. See Pettyjohn, 1992 WL 105162, at *1.
216. See id.
217. See Agosto v. Trusswal Sys. Corp., 142 F.R.D. 118, 121 (E.D. Pa. 1992).
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was entitled to recover. 218 The court reasoned that it would be mani-
festly unfair to permit a plaintiff to recover for damages for a life span
that he may never live out.21 9 The court opined that discovering evi-
dence of plaintiff's HIV status was necessary to adequately defend
against future damages.
220
2. HIV Testing in Child Custody Cases
In addition to claims for future damages, parties have filed mo-
tions to compel HIV testing in child custody cases, arguing that a per-
son's HIV status is an important factor in determining his ability to
raise the child.2 21 In Doe v. Roe,222 a 1988 case from New York, grand-
parents of two minor children sought to gain custody from the fa-
ther.223 Under New York court rules, a movant must generally show
that the plaintiff placed his physical condition in controversy and that
the evidence is material and relevant to the action before the court
orders a physical examination. 224 With most of the opinion discussing
the mechanics of HIV testing and the nature of HIV and AIDS, a New
York family law court extended the general requirements for ordering
a physical examination in cases of HIV testing by stating that litigants
must also prove a compelling need for the test before it is ordered.
225
Realizing the need for more stringent boundaries for HIV testing to
protect against the stigmatization associated with AIDS, to prevent the
218. See Agosto, 142 F.R.D. at 120.
219. See id. (stating that "basic fairness dictates that Plaintiff should not be allowed to
make a potentially large recovery against [Defendant] based on an average life span when,
in reality, Plaintiff may well have a shorter than average life expectancy").
220. See id. But see Colella, supra note 205, at 68 (discussing the case of Herbert v. Amrex-
Zetron, No. C 709912 (L.A. Sup. Ct. filed Dec. 30, 1988), which held that an employer
.could not discover the HIV status of a non-party or 'any other aspect of [the non-party's]
medical condition which might reveal whether or not [the non-party] is infected with HIV
or has or does not have any other symptoms of Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome"'
(alterations in original)). For an article on setting boundaries for use of HWV information
in court, see Colella, supra note 205, at 45 ("The threshold question in any discovery dis-
pute involving HIV-related information should be whether the information is critical to the
requesting party's case.").
221. See Doe v. Roe, 526 N.Y.S.2d 718, 726 (Sup. Ct. 1988); see generally Steven L. v.
Dawn J., 561 N.Y.S.2d 322, 324 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1990) (determining whether HIV status is
important to custody issues).
222. 526 N.Y.S.2d 718 (Sup. Ct. 1988).
223. See id. at 719-20.
224. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 3121 (a) (McKinney 1991) ("After commencement of an action
in which the mental or physical condition or the blood relationship of a party . . . is in
controversy, any party may serve notice on another party to submit to a physical, mental or
blood examination by a designated physician.").
225. See Doe, 526 N.Y.S.2d at 725.
Winter 2000]
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
potential discrimination suffered by people living with AIDS, and to
protect the privacy of those living with HIV or AIDS, the court re-
quired the party seeking the test to show a compelling need for the
test instead of the traditional "good cause" requirement.
2 26
3. HIV Testing in "Fear of AIDS" Cases
The most difficult type of case that courts face arises when the
HIV status of one of the parties is central to the lawsuit. This occurs
particularly in "fear of AIDS" cases. A "fear of AIDS" case is one in
which a plaintiff sues on the basis of possible exposure to AIDS or HIV
by a person who intentionally or negligently exposed the plaintiff to
the risk.227 These cases rarely focus on the actual results of the test.
Rather, the focus is on whether the plaintiff can make her case with-
out the test by showing a reasonable fear of infection regardless of
actual transmission of the virus. In one Wisconsin case, the plaintiff
was a social worker suing a former client who became violent at a
hearing.2 28 The defendant bit the plaintiff during the altercation and
immediately told the plaintiff that she had AIDS. 229 The plaintiff
brought a lawsuit claiming assault and battery, including a claim for
pain and suffering damages. 230 To prove her damages, both emo-
226. See id. at 726. New York courts have continued to give special protection to the use
of HIV information in child custody cases. Even in a case where only HIV medical records
were sought, a New York court held that HIV status did not necessarily change a person's
ability to raise a child because an individual who is HIV-positive can be quite healthy and
remain so for many years. See Steven L., 561 N.Y.S.2d at 326 (recognizing that not all people
who are HIV-positive will develop AIDS within a particular time).
227. See, e.g., Syring v. Tucker, 498 N.W.2d 370 (Wis. 1993) (discussing how defendant
allegedly bit plaintiff and immediately stated that she had AIDS). For a general discussion
on AIDS phobia cases, see Wendy Allison Reese, 7ort Law: Actual Exposure or Possible Expo-
sure?: The AIDS Phobia Debate-Are Courts Opening the Litigation floodgates or Illustrating Judi-
cial Proscription? 22 AM. J. TRIAL Anvoc. 495, 495 (1998) (stating that presently most
jurisdictions are unwilling to allow a plaintiff to recover in AIDS phobia cases absent a
showing of actual exposure to the HIV virus); see also Pendergist v. Pendergrass, 961 S.W.2d
919, 926 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that absent proof of actual exposure to the HIV
virus as a result of a defendant's negligent conduct, that is, proof of both a scientifically
accepted method, or channel, of transmission and the presence of the HIV virus, the fear
of contracting AIDS is unreasonable as a matter of law and, therefore, not a legally com-
pensable injury). But see Hartwig v. Oregon Trail Eye Clinic, 580 N.W.2d 86 (Neb. 1998)
(representing the minority viewpoint). The Nebraska Supreme Court held that actual ex-
posure to HIV was not necessary and stated that "it is not unreasonable to fear HIV infec-
tion or AIDS when one ... is exposed via a medically sufficient channel of transmission to
the tissue, blood, or body fluid of another and it is impossible or impracticable to ascertain
whether that tissue, blood, or body fluid is in fact HIV positive." Id. at 91.




tional and physical, and out of concern that she may have contracted
HIV, the plaintiff asked the court to compel the defendant to undergo
HIV testing.231 The court ordered the test and the defendant refused
to comply.2 32 The court then ordered the defendant to pay twenty-
thousand dollars for mental distress under the presumption that HIV
was not transmitted, but based on the fear and anxiety the plaintiff
suffered from the possibility that she may have contracted the virus.
233
The plaintiff appealed on the grounds that the lower court should
have taken further steps to force the defendant to undergo an HIV
test before it awarded a minimal amount of damages. 234 The appellate
court agreed and ordered a new hearing on damages after the defend-
ant submitted to an HIV test.235 In its opinion, the court recognized
the privacy concerns associated with making the defendant's HIV sta-
tus open to the court, but stated that the defendant waived her privacy
claim when she yelled out that she had AIDS after biting the plain-
tiff.236 Nevertheless, the court applied a more stringent standard and
held that the plaintiff demonstrated a compelling need for the test
based on the fact that a negative test would eliminate the anxiety and
uncertainty that the plaintiff lives with daily.
23 7
In Brown v. New York City Health and Hosp. Corp.,2 38 another fear of
AIDS case, defendant requested that the court order the plaintiff to
undergo HIV testing to diminish the damages for her AIDS-phobia
claim. 23 9 In this case, a nurse sustained a deep puncture wound to her
thumb from a needle that was taken out of a baby who was HIV posi-
tive.240 The court stated that if the plaintiff were actually claiming to
have contracted the virus, the court would have ordered the test.
2 41 If
the plaintiff files a lawsuit seeking damages for having contracted
AIDS, she "places her HIV status in issue and may not thereafter re-
231. See id. at 372.
232. See id.
233. See id. at 372-73.
234. See id. at 373.
235. See id. at 377-78.
236. See id. at 378.
237. See id. The court failed to realize other means of getting the information, such as
ordering the plaintiff to undergo an HIV test six months after the incident. Six months is
generally considered the maximum time that HIV antibodies develop if a person is ex-
posed to HIV. Diagnostics (HIV) New Device Enables Earlier HIV Detection, AIDS WEEKLv PLUS,
Oct. 20, 1997, available in 1997 WL 14714713. A negative result at that time, therefore,
would mean that the plaintiff had not contracted HIV. See id.
238. 624 N.Y.S.2d 768, 769 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995).
239. See Brown, 624 N.Y.S.2d at 769.
240. See id. at 770.
241. See id. at 771.
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fuse to submit to a definitive HIV-antibody test."24 2 The court, how-
ever, denied the motion for a blood test of the plaintiff because the
case was an AIDS-phobia case, which does not require a showing of
actual transmission, only exposure.
243
B. HIV Testing and AIDS Policies-Exceptionalists Versus
Traditionalists
As illustrated by the above HIV testing cases, courts are less likely
to order testing when they make a determination that, because of the
stigmatization surrounding the disease, AIDS is different from other
diseases. Courts that do order HIV tests, however, are ignoring the
concerns expressed by many public health officials who oppose
mandatory HIV testing. Although the public health debate does not
usually involve court-ordered HIV testing, the arguments are very simi-
lar in both contexts. In debating the idea of mandatory HIV testing,
public health officials and civil libertarians have had to decide how to
treat AIDS while also addressing individual privacy issues. In doing so,
they have had to decide to what extent HIV should receive special
legal attention. The debate is generally divided between exceptional-
ists and traditionalists. 244 The discourse involving the special nature of
HIV testing highlights the differences between these two groups and
their views regarding mandatory HIV testing.
1. Exceptionalist View-HIV Is Unique
Policymakers clearly recognized the unique nature of HIV and
AIDS during the infancy of the disease.245 To civil libertarians and gay
242. Id.
243. See id. at 769-70.
244. Ronald Bayer discusses how civil libertarians and gay activists have dominated the
discourse regarding HIV policy, terming these individuals HIV exceptionalists. See Ronald
Bayer, Ph.D., Public Health Policy and the AIDS Epidemic: An End to HIV Exceptionalism?, 324
NEw ENG. J. MED. 1500, 1501 (1991). To see how the HIV policy debate has divided into
two groups, see Marcia Angell, A Dual Approach to the AIDS Epidemic, 324 NEw ENG. J. MED.
1498, 1499 (1991); Scott Burris, Public Health, "AIDS Exceptionalism" and the Law, 27J. MAR-
SHALL L. Riv. 251, 251-54 (1994); Stephen C. Joseph, M.D., M.P.H., Premarital AIDS Test-
ing: Public Policy Abandoned at the Altar, 261 JAMA 3456, 3456 (1989).
245. A great deal of the policy regarding HIV was determined in the 1980s and early
1990s when the public was still relatively ignorant as to how HIV is transmitted, what HIV
testing will determine, and the types of treatment available to persons infected with HIV.
This ignorance added to the fears associated with the disease, inducing a higher level of
fear among the public. See Jon Van, Ignorance: Knowledge Gap Thwarts Prevention, Treatment,
ORANGE COUNTY REG., Sept. 17, 1989, at L09 (discussing how significant gaps in scientific
understanding are hampering efforts to protect individuals from the virus and to provide
those who contract it with useful therapies); see also Charles Petit, S.F Pupils Get Mixed
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activists, the unique nature of AIDS was readily apparent.246 AIDS was
instantly characterized as this generation's plague, which quickly man-
ifested itself in fear and prejudice. 247 Being HIV-positive has always
been equated with being given a "death sentence. '248 Even today, a
fear is attached to the disease because it remains incurable, although
certain treatments have helped slow the inevitable nature of the dis-
ease.249 As well as being labeled a lethal disease, HIV has usually been
associated with homosexuals, intravenous-drug users, or those with
high-risk sex lives. 250 As a result, those with HIV are often isolated and
subjected to disparate treatment. 251 Since the discovery of HIV, peo-
ple with AIDS have been denied medical treatment, denied access to
schools, fired from their jobs and denied health insurance.
252
Marks in AIDS Survey, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 2, 1987, at 7 (reporting that most San Francisco
high school students in 1987 knew that AIDS is contracted mainly from sex, but an alarm-
ingly high proportion did not know much about avoiding it).
246. See Peter H. Berge, Setting Limits on Involuntary HIV Antibody Testing Under Rule 35
and State Independent Medical Examination Statutes, 44 FLA. L. Rv. 767, 777-78 (1992).
247. See id. at 778.
248. Id. at 779.
249. See Henry L. Davis, Many Living Longer with AIDS Face Challenges, BUFFALO NEWS,
Apr. 17, 1998, at Al (discussing how attitudes of people with HIV are changing now that
infected individuals are living longer with the development of successful drug treatments,
such as protease inhibitors). Instead of making plans to die, infected individuals are worry-
ing about what to do with the rest of their lives. The article reports that in a Buffalo-area
survey, a majority of infected individuals said that they want to go back to work. See id. A
change in attitude could be gauged by the dozens of people who packed a recent seminar
that offered employment advice to the H1V-infected. See id. See also Sandra Mathers, AIDS
Treatment Center Marks 10 Years of Radical Change in Public Attitudes, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Feb.
5, 1998, at I1 (discussing how attitudes of individuals infected by AIDS or HIV in central
Florida have changed, but noting that infected people still need support centers because
they are living longer thanks to a new generation of more effective AIDS drugs). Many of
those who are now finding out that they are infected are deciding to keep their jobs, while
a number of infected individuals, extremely ill for years, now are stable and thinking of
going back to work. See id, See generally Lynda Richardson, Wave of New AIDS Laws Seeks to
Protect Public; Focus Shifts as Attitudes About Disease Change, CINCINATrI ENQUIRER, Sept. 27,
1998, atA18 (discussing how public perception of AIDS and HIV has changed because new
AIDS drugs have transformed what was seen as a fatal disease into a chronic condition for
many people, making early testing and treatment more important).
250. See Tracy E. Hopkins, AIDS: The Professional Killer, BLACK PROFESSIONAL, Fall 1994,
at 34, available in 1994 WL 14531057; Robert J. Paul & James B. Townsend, AIDS in the
Workplace: Balancing Employer and Employee Rights, 18 REv. Bus. 9 (1997), available in 1999
WL 18073947.
251. See Hopkins, supra note 250, at 34; Paul & Townsend, supra note 250, at 9.
252. See Cheryl Frank, AIDS Victims Are Wary of Discrimination, A.B.A.J., Nov. 1985, at 19
(stating that paramedics refused to give aid to a heart attack victim when they thought,
wrongly, that he had AIDS); Municipal Hospital in Bronx Fined on Care of AIDS Victim, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 16, 1986, at B1O (reporting that a hospital was fined for refusing to give ade-
quate care to a man with AIDS); see also Leckelt v. Board of Comm'rs, 909 F.2d 820 (5th
Cir. 1990) (allowing a nurse to be discharged for not disclosing H1V test results); Doe v.
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Because AIDS has often been associated with homosexuality, it
produces a fear in people who are HIV positive that they will also suf-
fer from discrimination based on the assumption that they are homo-
sexual. 253 Many homosexuals have also been afraid of being tested,
not only out of fear of dying, but also out of the fear of being outed.
In an effort to encourage people to get tested, to quell the rapid
growth of the disease, and to alleviate the fears associated with AIDS,
states have enacted statutes mandating that testing be anonymous and
voluntary and that the results remain confidential. 254 However, even
with the general acceptance of the premise that HIV is unique and
that HIV testing should be voluntary, courts have still compelled HIV
Ball, 725 F. Supp. 1210 (M.D. Fla. 1988), affd sub nom., Doe v. Garrett, 903 F.2d 1455 (11th
Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 904 (1991) (allowing a member of the Naval Reserve to be
released because of a positive HIV test); Ray v. School Dist., 666 F. Supp. 1524 (M.D.
Fla.1987) (seeking a preliminary injunction to prevent a school from segregating three
hemophiliac school children who tested positive for HIV); White v. Western Sch. Corp.,
No. IP-85-1192-C (S.D. Ind. Aug. 23, 1985) (LEXIS, Genfed Library, Dist. File) (holding
that a child with HIV must exhaust all administrative remedies prior to seeking a prelimi-
nary injunction to prevent the school from segregating the child); Aviles v. United States,
696 F. Supp. 217 (E.D. La.1988) (compelling a member of the Coast Guard to retire be-
cause of a positive HIV test result); District 27 Community Sch. Bd. v. Board of Educ., 502
N.Y.S.2d 325 (Sup. Ct. 1986) (holding that education officials and health commissioners
were not required by law to exclude children with AIDS from the classroom); Doe v. Rice,
769 F. Supp. 440 (D.P.R.1991) (requesting evidentiary hearing to determine whether a
member of the National Guard to be discharged after testing positive for HIV); Sierra
Perez v. United States, 779 F. Supp. 637 (D.P.R.1991) (allowing a hospital employee to be
discharged after testing positive for HIV); Plowman v. United States Dep't of Army, 698 F.
Supp. 627 (E.D. Va. 1988) (allowing a civilian musician employed by the Army to be dis-
missed after testing positive for HIV); Faye A. Silas, Is School for AU?, A.B.A.J., Nov. 1985, at
18 (discussing the case of Ryan White who was not allowed to attend school because he had
AIDS); Pamela Washington-Carter, Comment, AIDS and Disability-Based Discrimination in
Employer-Provided Health Insurance: The ADA Imposes Liability for Broken Promises, 20 S.U. L.
REV. 457, 457-58 (1993).
253. See Angell, supra note 244, at 1498; see generally Burris, supra note 244, at 264 (dis-
cussing AIDS fear and discrimination).
254. See, e.g., Tracy Jackson Smith, AIDS and the Law: Protecting the HIV-Infected Employee
from Discrimination, 57 Tenn. L. Rev. 539 (1990) (arguing for laws that protect the confi-
dentiality of HIV information in order to protect against discrimination); Frederick T.
Smith, AIDS-Based Employment Discrimination in the American and Canadian Workplace, 10
COMP. LAB. L.J. 531, 545 (1989) (discussing state laws which protect individuals infected by
HIV and AIDS).
HIV-infected persons in the United States may be protected by state statutes
modeled after the Federal Rehabilitation Act, which prohibit discrimination
against the handicapped. All fifty states and the District of Columbia have either
statutes or executive orders which ban discrimination in the workplace based on
an individual's physical handicap or disability. Unlike the federal act, most state




testing. Only those courts that have recognized the unique conse-
quences of HIV testing have been less inclined to order it.
2. Traditionalist's View-HIV Is No Different from Other
Communicative Diseases
Arguing against this special treatment of HIV and HIV testing,
Ronald Bayer, a leading public health commentator, began to ques-
tion the need for granting HIV this exceptional status. In discussing
how the exceptional treatment afforded HIV will wane as treatments
become more successful,255 Bayer is one of the first to characterize the
participants in the debate as exceptionalist or traditionalist.256 Excep-
tionalists are those who advocate for the special treatment of HIV and
HIV testing, 257 while traditionalists believe that HIV should be treated
like all other lethal and communicative diseases.
258
255. See Bayer, supra note 244, at 1503.
256. See id. at 1501.
257. The universally accepted manner in controlling the disease included voluntary,
anonymous testing that was to remain confidential. See Anonymous Tests Lead to Earlier AIDS
Treatment; CDC Studies Results Before and After States Required Names, BALTIMORE SUN, Oct. 28,
1998, at 8A; Dorine Bethea, Early Test for HIV is Key to Control, RICHMOND TIMEs-DISPATCH,
June 25, 1999, at BI; Jeffrey Levi, Ph.D. et al., Anonymous HIV Testing and Medical Care,
JAMA, June 23, 1999, at 2282; Testing (HIV) Confidential vs. Anonymous Testing May Make a
Difference, AIDS WKLV. PLUS, Nov. 9, 1998.
258. See Bayer, supra note 244, at 1503. Bayer continuously makes pointed references to
the "well-organized gay community," seeming to imply that the traditional practices of pub-
lic health were implemented solely because of the strong lobby of gay activists:
In the first years of the AIDS epidemic, U.S. officials had no alternative but to
negotiate the course of AIDS policy with representatives of a well-organized gay
community and their allies in the medical and political establishments. In this
process, many of the traditional practices of public health that might have been
brought to bear were dismissed as inappropriate. As the first decade of the epi-
demic came to an end, public health officials began to reassert their professional
dominance over the policy-making process and in so doing began to rediscover
the relevance of their own professional traditions to the control of AIDS.
Id. at 1502. Bayer's article summarily dismisses the reasons for the special treatment given
to AIDS. See id. at 1501-04. By doing so, he inappropriately underestimates the potential
stigma and discrimination suffered by HIV-positive people (most of whom are gay), the
argument that was the cornerstone of the "exceptionalist" policy. During the 1980s, and
even today, gay men suffer discrimination and are often the subject of hate crimes. Recent
reports show that AIDS discrimination has continued to be a problem. See Lisa Van Proyen,
Study Reveals Discrimination Against Area People with HIV, L.A. DAILY NEWS, Sept. 18, 1998, at
Nil (reporting that discrimination is still very much an issue for those seeking employ-
ment in the Los Angeles area). The study analyzed employment issues for Los Angeles
residents living with HIV and AIDS. See id. "The survey was mailed to 5,685 people with HIV
or AIDS who are case-managed by Los Angeles-area AIDS service organizations.... About
67% of those not working said they are unemployed or disabled, with a majority reporting
that they are thinking about returning to the work force to increase their income and feel
useful to society. While the law states that no HIV-infected person can be denied employ-
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In developing policies with sometimes conflicting interests, the
debate has often centered on the mechanics of HIV testing: rules pro-
tecting anonymity, voluntariness, and confidentiality. Some medical
and public health officials have advocated that AIDS should be treated
as all communicable diseases are treated: documenting test results,
notifying the sex partners of those infected, reporting the names of
HIV infected individuals, and criminalizing the knowing transmission
of the disease. 25 9 They argue that these steps were effectively used in
treating past diseases and are now necessary to slow the spread of HIV,
whereas additional protections would allow the disease to grow at a
rapid pace.
260
ment because of the disease, many fear that they will lose their current health insur-
ance . . . and will not obtain adequate insurance from a new employer." Id. Los Angeles
mayor Richard Riordan vowed to encourage health insurers to cover all employees, includ-
ing those with AIDS. See id. "Their medications alone can cost $12,000 to $16,000 a year."
Id. See also AIDS; Patient Discrimination Becoming a Global Problem, DAYTON DAILY NEWS, July 3,
1998, at 16A. The article reported that the World AIDS Congress conducted a study which
revealed that:
Many HIV-positive people face bias throughout the world, including denial of the
right to marry, refusal of medication and other treatment and job discrimina-
tion.... [F]ear of being branded an outcast keeps many from litigating and also
stops some from getting tested, helping fuel the spread of the virus .... In a study
of 100 [individuals] who complained of HIV discrimination in Mexico, only 21
went to court....
Id.
Because this discrimination is still present, privacy concerns should remain a major
part of the debate surrounding AIDS. However, the change from AIDS being a "life sen-
tence" to a manageable disease, because of the more effective treatments available, should
also factor into the debate. The availability of treatments will likely change the policy sur-
rounding HIV testing, but the public's continued misperception of AIDS should play a
factor in shaping this debate as well. See Richardson, supra note 249, at A18. The article
reported that
[f] ifty-five percent of Americans believed in 1997 that they could become infected
by sharing a drinking glass with an infected person, compared with 48 percent in
1991, according to [a] survey by researchers at the University of California at
Davis. Forty-one percent believed that AIDS might be contracted from a public
toilet, compared with 34 percent in 1991.
Id. According to Dr. Gregory Herek, a social psychologist, "such erosion in knowledge
about HIV may reflect the fact that recent public health campaigns have not emphasized
that the disease is transmitted through sexual contact, tainted hypodermic needles or
blood." Id.
259. See Bayer, supra note 244, at 1501-02; Chandler Burr, The AIDS Exception: Privacy
vs. Public Health, AT"LANTIC MONTHLY,June 1997, at 57, 57-58. But see Gabriel Rotello, Edito-
rial, AIDS Is Still an Exceptional Disease, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 1997, at A23 (advocating that a
move away from AIDS exceptionalism "should proceed with caution, and with a healthy
sense of what we still don't know, and what we need to find out").
260. See Bayer, supra note 244, at 1501-03.
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COURT-ORDERED GENETIC TESTING
C. The Implications of HIV Testing and AIDS Policies for Genetic
Testing Under Rule 35
The categorization of the public health debate as exceptionalists
versus traditionalists has also encompassed discussions surrounding
genetic testing. "Genetic exceptionalists," those who advocate for the
special treatment of genetic information, believe that genetic informa-
tion is uniquely private information and more personal than even a
person's HIV status. 261 Thomas Murray, the first to use the term "ge-
netic exceptionalism," claims that the drafters of the GPA262 are the
leaders in the exceptionalist camp. 263 He bases his claim on the sub-
stance of the GPA, which is designed to protect the confidentiality and
personal nature of genetic information by limiting the use of the in-
formation, protecting against genetic discrimination, limiting the use
of DNA databases, and setting forth stringent rules regarding the col-
lection, analysis and storage of DNA and genetic information.
264
1. Genetic Exceptionalists-Genetic Information Is Unique
In claiming that genetic information is unique, the drafters of the
GPA found information contained in DNA to be highly personal and
distinct for a number of reasons. These reasons include the fact that
genetic information can sometimes predict a person's likelihood of
developing a disease and that genetic tests divulge information about
a person's parents, siblings, and children.265 Because genes are inher-
ited, a positive result from a genetic test will likely give information
about the medical condition of the person's family.2 66 Another impor-
tant distinction advanced by genetic exceptionalists is that genetic in-
formation may be used to discriminate against a person in the areas of
employment and insurance.
267
261. See Mark A. Rothstein, Discrimination Based on Genetic Information, 33 JUIIMETRICS J.
13, 13-18 (1992) [hereinafter Rothstein, Discrimination Based on Genetic Information];
Thomas H. Murray, Genetic Exceptionalism and "Future Diaries": Is Genetic Information Different
from Other Medical Information?, in GENETIC SECRETS, PROTECTING PRIVACY AND CONFIDENTIAL-
ITY IN THE GENETIC ERA 60, 60-62 (1997).
262. See Murray, supra note 261, at 61. The model Genetic Privacy Act was introduced
in Congress, hearings were held, but no action was taken. See S. RES. 89, 105th Cong.
§ 9811 (1997); H.R. RES. 306, 105th Cong. § 713 (1997); S. REs. 1045, 105th Cong. (1997);
S. RES. 1694, 104th Cong. §2 (1996); H.R. RES 2748, 104th Cong. (1995).
263. See Murray, supra note 261, at 61.
264. See id. at 60-62.
265. See Annas et al., Drafting the Genetic Privacy Act, supra note 103, at 360.
266. See id.
267. See Meredith A. Jagutis, Insurer's Access to Genetic Information: The Call for Comprehen-
sive Federal Legislation, 82 MARQ. L. REv. 429, 435 (1999); Melinda B. Kaufmann, Genetic
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Along with the drafters of the GPA, other public health officials
and civil libertarians have argued for the exceptional treatment of ge-
netic information in debating the level of legal protections needed to
guard against genetic discrimination and in discussing ways to re-
search genetic information without violating individual privacy.
268
These genetic exceptionalists, agreeing with the GPA's drafters, have
argued against mandatory genetic testing. Instead, they have advo-
cated for voluntary genetic testing only after the individual has been
fully informed of the nature of the tests and the informational risks
associated with the results.
269
Discrimination in the Workplace: An Overview of Existing Protections, 30 Loy. U. CH. L.J. 393,
393 (1999); Rothstein, Discrimination Based on Genetic Information, supra note 261, at 13.
268. See Kaufmann, supra note 267 (arguing that genetic information deserves more
protection than other forms of medical information because it is uniquely personal). Ac-
cording to Kaufmann:
The information available through our genes, including the potential to unlock
secrets unknown even to the individual, highlights the unique nature of genetic
information. In addition, genetic information carries implications not only for
the individual but also for his or her family. History, therefore, should be a guide
to determine the scope of privacy applicable to genetic information. Specifically,
the release of genetic information conjures up the specters of social stigma, em-
ployment and insurance discrimination, and ultimately creates a genetic
underclass.
Id. at 430; see also Lori B. Andrews & Ami S. Jaeger, Confidentiality of Genetic Information in the
Workplace, 17 AM. J.L. & MED. 75, 77 (1991) (arguing that "genetic information is particu-
larly sensitive because genetic screening and monitoring reveal much more personal infor-
mation about the individual than other types of medical surveillance used by employers");
Elizabeth B. Cooper, Testing for Genetic Traits: The Need for a New Legal Doctrine of Informed
Consent, 58 MD. L. REv. 346, 362-64 (1999):
Although scientific breakthroughs make testing a viable option for some individu-
als at risk for genetically linked disease, the indeterminate nature of test results
combined with various concerns-about lack of disease-appropriate treatment, or
access thereto; potential psychological harm to the person being tested; ramifica-
tions for other family members; possible breaches of privacy; and the risk of dis-
crimination based on positive results-must be considered by clinicians who plan
to offer genetic testing.
Id. at 363-64. See also Lawrence 0. Gostin, Genetic Privacy, 23 J.L. MED. & ETHIcs 320,
324-26 (1995) (arguing that an individual's genetic information may have far-reaching
implications for those in the same racial or ethnic group) [hereinafter Gostin, Genetic Pri-
vacy]; Gostin, Health Information Privacy, supra note 200, at 491 (stating that "[t]he current
and likely future proliferation of genetic databases means that holders of these genomic
data will possess vast amounts of information" and that "[g]enetic information does not
simply reveal important health and personal characteristics of individuals, but also pro-
vides important biological facts about their parents, siblings, and children"); Mark A. Roth-
stein, Should Genetic Information Be Used to Predict Life Expectancy of Plaintiffs in Tort Cases? 34
Hous. LAw. 49, 50-51 (Oct. 1996) (arguing that genetic information should be subject to
greater protection than other kinds of medical information).
269. See Cooper, supra note 268, at 419.
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2. Genetic Traditionalists-Genetic Information Is No Different
from Other Medical Information
Not until the last few years have people argued against special
protections for genetic information. These genetic traditionalists have
begun to question the need for additional protections against discrim-
ination, believing that discrimination based on a genetic disorder
would be covered by the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), a
position held by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
("EEOC") .270 Other traditionalists believe that genetic information is
no different than other medical information. 27 1 Those who do not see
any real difference between "regular" medical information and ge-
netic information either believe that medical privacy laws already ade-
quately cover genetic information, 272 or they believe that the whole
genetic privacy debate is just a symptom of the inadequacies of the
current state of medical privacy laws, and that policymakers should
not limit their focus to genetic privacy laws.
27 3
a. Genetic Information: No More Predictive of Future Diseases
Than Other Medical Information
In Murray's article Genetic Exceptionalism and Future Diaries, he at-
tempts to show that the GPA's drafters are incorrect in declaring that
genetics is "so uniquely powerful and uniquely personal" that it
270. See Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, 2 EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL §
902.8, at 902-45 (1995) (the definition of the term "disability" provides that an individual
who is subject to discrimination based on genetic predisposition is regarded as an individ-
ual with a disability and thus covered under the ADA). In March of 1995, the EEOC issued
regulations clarifying the definition of "disability" under the ADA. The EEOC regulations
prohibit an employer from discriminating against a worker on the basis of his genetic
make-up. See id. The provision extends coverage to include "individuals who are subject to
discrimination on the basis of genetic information relating to illness, disease, or other dis-
orders." Id.
271. See Murray, supra note 261, at 61.
272. See id. at 61-62; Robert Wachbroit, The Question Not Asked: The Challenge of Pleio-
tropic Genetic Tests, 8 KENNEDY INST. ETHIcsJ. 131, 140 (1998) ("[T]o insist that counseling
should be routinely provided whenever the medical test is genetic leads to a mystique sur-
rounding the idea of genes that encourages misunderstandings about what genes are and
distorts their significance.").
273. See Angela Liang, The Argument Against A Physician's Duty to Warn for Genetic Dis-
eases: The Conflicts Created by Safer v. Estate of Pack, 1 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POCY 437, 441
(1998) (discussing a physician's conflicting duties under NewJersey law between confiden-
tiality and warning a patient's family members about the patient's genetically-transferable
condition); Paul A. Lombardo, Genetic Confidentiality: What's the Big Secret ?, 3 U. CHI. L. SCH.
ROUNDTABLE 589 (1996) (arguing that genetic confidentiality law is not the cure to the
health care access crisis).
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should be distinguished from other medical information.2 74 He at-
tacks each of the arguments put forth by the privacy advocates and
decries the plea to treat genetic information differently as an "overly
dramatic view of the significance of genetic information in our
lives":275
It implies that the contents of that future diary reflect what is most
intimate, central, and important about us-that it reveals, in some
fundamental way, our social and personal identity, our loves and
interests, and our actions. In fact, our genomes have little or noth-
ing to say about any of these crucial matters.
276
In making his argument that genetic information is not distinc-
tive enough to warrant special treatment, Murray sees no difference in
the ability of genetic information to be more predictive in mapping a
person's future health than other medical information. 277 For in-
stance, information about one's cholesterol level or a chronic hepati-
tis B infection are often hidden but are no less predictive of a person's
future health than genetic information, and these risks have not been
given special protection. 278 They are only medical facts that are cov-
ered by existing medical privacy laws.
279
b. Genetic Information: No More Traumatic than Other Medical
Information
The argument that a person's family is affected by the informa-
tion is also not distinctive according to Murray. 280 He compares ge-
netic information to knowledge that a member of a family suffers
from heart disease or tuberculosis.2 81 The fact that a family member
has tuberculosis is of special importance to the family because they
could easily be infected with tuberculosis, and the family of a heart
patient has an interest in the information to better prepare for the
individual's death or disability. 282 The stress associated with informing
family members about difficult medical information may be no differ-
ent where it is genetically related.
283
274. Murray, supra note 261, at 62.
275. Id. at 71.
276. Id. at 67.
277. See id. at 64.
278. See id. at 64-65.
279. See id.






c. Genetic Information: Not Unique in Leading to Discrimination
In terms of discrimination, Murray believes that genetic informa-
tion is not unique. 284 Institutions and individuals have used all kinds
of information that can lead to discrimination. 28 5 Insurance compa-
nies constantly assess an individual's risk for future health threats by
examining family history and past medical problems286-insurance is
often denied on that basis.287 Genetic information is not exceptional
in that regard. Murray states that it is not reasonable to allow an insur-
ance company to discriminate on the basis of a current health condi-
tion that is not genetically related and then to carve out an exception
for genetic discrimination. 288 Practically, this would be very difficult
anyway. Many genetic diseases may be affected by environmental fac-
tors, so it is difficult to distinguish between a disease that is genetic
and one that is non-genetic.28 9 For example, if a person is a heavy
smoker and also has a genetic predisposition to cancer, should an in-
surance company be prohibited from denying coverage because a link
to cancer is probably going to be genetically related but it could also
be caused by the heavy use of cigarettes? Where should the line be
drawn? Huntington's Disease is a purely genetic disease.290 Getting hit
by a bus is purely non-genetic. Those are easy examples, but a prob-
lem occurs for conditions like heart disease that sometimes are par-
tially caused by a person's genes and partially caused by other
environmental factors.291 Cholesterol is a risk factor and can be con-
284. See id. at 65-66.
285. See id.
286. See id.
287. See id; see also Gary Schuman, Health and Life Insurance Applications: Their Role in the
Claims Review Process, 62 DEF. CouNs. J. 225, 225 (1995). Schuman notes:
[I]nsurance companies are permitted to select their risks and to restrict or even
deny coverage for life and health insurance to individuals when, in the opinion of
the insurer, restriction is necessitated by the applicant's medical condition or per-
sonal history. The goal is not equal treatment of policyholders, but equitable
treatment based on the risk that applicants represent to the insurer. Insurance, by
its very nature, is recognized as being 'discriminatory.'
Id. at 225 (citing Imperial Casualty & Indem. Co. v. Sogomonian, 243 Cal. Rptr. 639, 645
(1988) (holding that the insured's failure to disclose earth movement and subsidence
amounted to material fraud thus giving the insurer a right to rescind the homeowner's
policy) and Robinson v. Occidental Life Ins. Co., 281 P.2d 39, 42 (Cal. App. 1955) (exam-
ining the insurer's right to reject a claim or rescind a policy because of the decedent's false
representations on his life insurance application)).
288. See Murray, supra note 261, at 65.
289. See supra Part II.A (discussing how both genetic and environmental factors can
contribute to the onset of certain diseases and disorders).
290. See supra Part II.B.1.
291. See Murray, supra note 261, at 67-68.
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trolled, but our genes have as much to do with heart problems as do
other factors, making labeling almost impossible.
292
Murray finds the fact that a person's genetic composition is some-
thing that they cannot control to be irrelevant: "If we are less inclined
to worry about discrimination on the basis of health risk factors that
are open to modification and individual choice, then let us recognize
that as the relevant difference, and not confuse it with the distinction
between genetic and non-genetic factors. '293 Murray also argues that
providing a person with health care should not hinge on whether a
disease is based on genetic or non-genetic factors because it is most
likely that the need for health care is a product of both factors.2 94 As
one of these factors is not controllable, the distinction between non-
genetic and genetic factors is not important.
295
d. Mystique of Genetic Information
Murray concludes that we only consider genetic information spe-
cial because of a certain mystery associated with it.296 Others have
agreed with this assessment. The book The DNA Mystique: The Gene as a
Cultural Icon297 explains how genes have become a cultural phenome-
non.298 The glorified use of genetics in movies, television shows, and
science fiction stories that highlight the scary possibility of eugenics
and genetic cleansing and show the extremes of genetic determinism
have greatly exaggerated the relevance and importance of genetics to
society.
2 9 9
D. A Proposal: Testing Policy Should Be Based on the
Characteristics That Make Each Disease Unique
Using the categories detailed by Bayer and Murray in the medical
exceptionalism debate, however, gives little guidance on the proper
methods of dealing with diseases and their corresponding tests. In the
HIV testing and genetic testing areas, courts and policymakers should
292. See id. at 68.
293. Id. at 66.
294. See id. at 69.
295. See id.
296. See id. at 71.
297. DOROTHY NELKIN & SUSAN LINDEE, THE DNA MYSTIQUE: THE GENE AS A CULTURAL
ICON (1995).
298. See id. at 198-99.
299. See id. at 198-99; see also MARK H. HALLER, EUGENICS: HEREDITARLAN ATTITUDES IN
AMERICAN THOUGHT 77-78 (1963); KENNETH M. LUDMERER, GENETICS AND AMERICAN SOCI-




not have to first go through the cognitive step of determining whether
or not something is exceptional before mandating a test. A more prag-
matic approach is to accept that each disease has some unique quali-
ties that separate it from other diseases, and that its corresponding
test will produce different types of information. For example, a posi-
tive result for an HIV test means something quite different than a pos-
itive test for tuberculosis. Both are infectious diseases, but the
transmission and subsequent treatments are quite different. The re-
sults, therefore, send a completely different message to the individ-
ual-unlike a positive tuberculosis test, a positive HIV test may be
considered a death sentence. 300 Because these tests send different
messages, they are likely to cause different social and psychological
harms. As a result, decisions regarding the testing for diseases should
focus on these variances.
Treating every disease and its corresponding test as unique has
also been advocated in the HIV context.30' Scott Burris argues in his
article on HIV exceptionalism that HIV has not been treated differ-
ently from other comparable health threats.30 2 Rather, all feared dis-
eases rightfully get their own unique response. 30 3 Burris argues that
relying on a single set of public health policies is not warranted.
30 4
Burris found the public health's treatment of HIV over the past fifteen
to twenty years to be an appropriate balance between managing the
disease and dealing with the fears associated with it.305 The approach
advocated by traditionalists, where all communicative or lethal dis-
eases get the same treatment, lacks a social commitment to protecting
people with the disease. The traditionalists do not understand how
people respond to epidemics, thereby hurting the public's health and
infringe civil rights.
30 6
300. See Mark Taylor, TB Outbreak Fallout: ER Doc Who Contracted Disease Sues Hospital for
Lack of Warning, Precautions, MOD. HEALTHCARE, May 10, 1999, at 40, 42, available in 1999
WL8771423 (discussing how TB is a curable disease). According to a CDC public health
advisor, "'We [the CDC] don't expect anyone to die of TB. So when a death does occur,
it's abnormal.'" Id. See also Acute HIV Syndrome, 60 Am. FAM. PHYSIcIAN, Aug. 1, 1999, avail-
able in 1999 WL 24104710 (discussing how there is still no cure for the HIV virus).
301. See Burris, supra note 244, at 251.
302. See id. at 272.
303. See id. at 261-62.
304. See id. at 272.
305. See id. at 254-64.
306. See id. at 271.
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IV. An "Examination of the Examination" Approach to
Rule 35
Examining the specific characteristics of each disease in develop-
ing.public health policies also has value to courts in deciding whether
to order a genetic test under Rule 35. With new tests for certain lethal
diseases and genetic testing becoming more commonplace, the cur-
rent fact-based approach to Rule 35, where the court's main focus is
on the "in controversy" and "good cause" requirements, is outdated.
Given that genetic testing may reveal traumatic information or be in-
terpreted in several ways, genetic tests are significantly different than
the traditional physical and psychological examinations contemplated
by Rule 35.
Some courts have held that a party's request for a Rule 35 exami-
nation forces courts, to balance the rights of civil litigants to discover
relevant facts against the privacy interests of persons subject to discov-
ery. 307 By adding this balancing test to the "in controversy" and "good
cause" requirements of Rule 35, these courts have accepted the propo-
sition that certain examinations are so intrusive that they should not
be ordered.
With the changing uses of Rule 35 to include tests for a wide
range of diseases, many of which are lethal and untreatable, courts
need to continue their fact-based analyses of the "in controversy" and
"good cause" requirements. However, they should extend this to in-
clude a thorough "examination of the examination," where the focus
is on the mechanics of the procedure, what information the test will
produce, and the potential consequences of obtaining those results.
An "examination of the examination" analysis, therefore, requires
courts to focus on: (1) the informational risks associated with the test,
and (2) the actual value of the test for the purposes sought. This total-
ity of the circumstances approach does not limit courts to a simple
analysis of the "in controversy" and "good cause" requirements.
Rather, it requires courts to evaluate the impact of the order on the
person subject to the examination, as well as on third parties and soci-
ety in general.
A. Informational Risks
The "examination of the examination" approach to Rule 35 first
requires an assessment of the informational risks associated with the
307. See Crowe v. Nivison, 145 F.R.D. 657, 658 (D.C. Md. 1993); Lowe v. Philadelphia
Newspapers, Inc., 101 F.R.D. 296, 298 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
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procedure.30 8 The risks usually associated with medical procedures in-
volve risks to the human body through surgery or medicine. The pri-
mary risk posed by a genetic test, however, is the actual information
produced by the test.30 9 This informational risk manifests itself in sev-
eral ways, including "anxiety, distress, and other psychological harms
to subjects who learn that they carry genes that may predispose them
to serious medical problems. ' '3 10 These risks become even more preva-
lent when the genetic information reveals a disease or disorder that is
incurable or untreatable. Without an analysis of the informational
risks, courts fail to fully understand the depth of intrusiveness caused
by the Rule 35 examination.
Analyzing the informational risks associated with the test requires
a close examination of the potential impact that the information gar-
nered from the test could have on the individual being tested. The
impact may be psychological trauma to the individual tested, as well as
a violation of privacy through disclosure of the results to sources
outside of the litigation.
Aside from genetic testing, the most poignant example of infor-
mational risks can be seen in HIV testing. The information produced
by an HIV test can cause severe psychological trauma to the person
tested, and it can have a detrimental effect if the HIV-positive status is
disclosed to others. Among the detrimental effects that the tested per-
son may experience are: discrimination in employment, schooling,
and insurance;311 severe stigmatization by society;312 and fears of be-
ing classified as a homosexual, drug user, or sexual deviant.31 3 Similar
308. The term "informational risks" was first detailed in Ronald Green & A. Mathew




311. SeeJagutis, supra note 267, at 433; Kaufmann, supra note 267, at 400-04; Rothstein,
Discrimination Based on Genetic Information, supra note 261, at 14-16; Washington-Carter,
supra note 252, at 457-58.
312. See Paul R. Billings, M.D. et al., Discrimination as a Consequence of Genetic Screening,
50 Am. J. HUM. GENETIcs 476-82 (describing anecdotal evidence of discrimination against
individuals based on "apparent or perceived" genetic abnormalities); Karen L. Chadwick,
Fear of AIDS: The Catalyst for Expandingjudicial Recognition of a Duty to Preuent Emotional Dis-
tress Beyond Traditional Bounds, 25 N.M. L. REV. 143, 159 (1995).
313. See EricJ. Knapp, Tort Law-Turning Blood into Whine: "Fear of Aids" as a Cognizable
Cause of Action in New Mexico--Madrid v. Lincoln County Med. Ctr., 28 N.M. L. REV. 165,
188 (1998). The author states:
Anxiety arising from the possibility of contracting HIV and developing AIDS gen-
erally reflects public misperceptions, misinformation, and ignorance about the
disease. Furthermore, ignorance about HIV and AIDS promotes hysteria and irra-
tional fears, as well as prejudice, stigmatization and discrimination against those
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informational risks occur with genetic tests for lethal diseases, includ-
ing: the potential to unlock secrets that are currently unknown about
the person; the unique quality of the information enabling certain
identification of the individual; the stability of DNA rendering distant
future applications possible; the ability to generalize the data to fami-
lies, genetically related communities, and ethnic and racial
populations.
31 4
Informational risks may also impact third parties. Just as a positive
HIV test result can have implications for the individual's sex partner, a
genetic test result may impact the individual's family. The very idea of
genetic information implies inheritance, so a genetic test result often
gives information about the family of the individual tested, many of
whom would not otherwise be affected by the lawsuit. Further, genetic
test results can impact society by stigmatizing a certain racial or ethnic
group based upon a common genetic characteristic attributable only
to that group.
1. Risks to the Individual Tested: Impact of Learning the Results
The most extreme example of an informational risk involves the
discovery of a lethal disease. The effect the results have on the individ-
ual depends on the kind of information the test produces. A positive
test result for an incurable and untreatable disease is going to affect
the individual differently than a positive result for a disease that can
be easily treated with medication. One of the informational risks
feared from forcing a person to undergo an HIV test is the impact
that the results will have on the person being tested. Individuals who
have tested positive for HIV have suffered severe emotional trauma,
sometimes attempting suicide. 315 However, as HIV and AIDS have be-
come more treatable and have allowed people to live longer lives, the
psychological effects have become somewhat less traumatic.3 16
a. Risks of Discovering an Untreatable Disease
Depending on the level of trauma likely to be produced by a
court-ordered genetic test, the informational risks will vary widely ac-
cording to the treatments available, the severity of the symptoms, the
infected with HIV. For example, most people still believe that HIV can be trans-
mitted through casual contact, [and] that AIDS remains primarily a 'gay disease.'
Id.
314. See Gostin, Genetic Privacy, supra note 268, at 320-28.
315. See Chadwick, supra note 312, at 159.
316. See supra note 245 and accompanying text.
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prognosis for the disease, and the mathematical probability of getting
the disease. In arguing that genetic information is less than extraordi-
nary, traditionalists fail to recognize one key piece of the puzzle-
many people refuse to take a genetic test for fear that they may learn
that they have a disease which they cannot control, treat, or cure, a
view they likely will not change just because they filed a lawsuit. For
example, before the test for HD became available, a majority of peo-
ple at risk said that they would take the test.317 However, currently
only ten to fifteen percent of those at risk choose to be tested. 318 The
five reasons cited by researchers who have studied the low numbers of
test-takers include "(1) if the results were adverse, the risk of develop-
ing [HD] for existing children would increase, (2) the absence of an
effective cure, (3) potential loss of health insurance, (4) financial
costs of testing, and (5) inability to 'undo' the knowledge." 319 Because
there is no cure for HD, people opted not to take the test for fear of
suffering these negative consequences. People choose not to take ge-
netic tests for several reasons, but mostly because of the informational
risks associated with the tests, such as the potential for stigmatization
and discrimination, the fear that they may not be able to obtain health
or life insurance, the stress of having to possibly disclose negative in-
formation to family members, and the basic fear and anxiety associ-
ated with dying.320 Also, knowing whether one is a carrier of a disease
adds to the already difficult decision to reproduce, as well as adding to
the stress of deciding whether to disclose the information to other
family members.
32 1
An analysis of the informational risks in the context of genetic
testing, therefore, requires the court to ask a series of questions about
the medical test. Will a positive result mean that the individual will
likely die from an incurable and untreatable disease? Is there a cure?
Are there significant treatments? How will the lack of treatment or
cure affect the individual when she receives the results? Has the indi-
vidual avoided taking a genetic test previously? If so, for what reasons?
317. See Rothstein, Preventing the Discovery, supra note 207, at 895.
318. See Dorothy C. Wertz, Ph.D., Society and the Not-So-New Genetics: What Are We Afraid
o. Some Future Predictions from a Social Scientist, 13J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 299, 319
(1997).
319. Id.
320. Because the information for each disease is different, the impact on the individual
being tested will vary based on the possible interpretations of the results. See Eliot Marshall,
Gene Tests Get Tested, 275 Sci. 782 (1997). Courts, therefore, need to be cognizant of these
differences before ordering a test. See supra Part II.B.3.
321. See Wertz, supra note 318, at 319-21.
Winter 2000] COURT-ORDERED GENETIC TESTING
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
b. Seeking Discovery of Unavailable Information
In asking these questions, courts also need to understand the sig-
nificant distinction between court-ordered genetic testing and other
forms of discovery. Generally, in discovery, a litigant is seeking infor-
mation that exists and is already available to the litigants.3 22 But in a
compelled genetic test, the litigant is seeking information that is not
already known or available. The person being tested is, therefore,
used as a vehicle to obtain this unavailable information. In the typical
court-ordered medical or psychological exam, the information sought
is not likely to reveal unknown information, or information which will
have a significant impact on the individual's future. A medical exami-
nation under Rule 35 is usually based on the plaintiff's claim that he
or she suffers from an illness or injury. 323 The medical examination is
ordered to verify the injury.324 The same is true for a psychological
examination where a person is claiming a mental injury and the psy-
chological exam is used to confirm or discount that claim. 325 Unless a
Rule 35 motion is centered on a claim for genetic damage, currently
an unlikely prospect, the genetic test is not used to confirm or dis-
count an injury, but to determine information not readily available,
known, or possibly even suspected by the individual being tested. As a
result, the litigant may be forced to learn about her future health or
impending doom.
c. Proposal: Voluntary Testing with Informed Consent
The fears associated with learning that one has a life-threatening
condition have prompted most genetic medical and ethical scholars
to advocate voluntary testing with informed consent.326 Many public
322. In a request for production, a litigant is trying to obtain documents, records, or
other tangible objects. See FED. R. Civ. P. 34(a). In a deposition, the litigant is trying to
obtain information known to the deponent. See FED. R. Civ. P. 30.
323. See supra Part I.
324. See supra Part I.
325. See supra Part I.
326. See generally Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1, 9 (Cal. 1972) (holding that a person of
adult years and of sound mind has the right, in exercise of control over his own body, to
determine whether or not to submit to lawful medical treatment); see also A.M. Capron,
Informed Consent in Catastrophic Disease Research and Treatment, 123 U. PA. L. REiv., 341-438
(1974); Larry R. Churchill et al., Genetic Research as Therapy: Implications of "Gene Therapy"for
Informed Consent, 26J.L. MED. & ETHiCS 38, 45 (1998); Cooper, supra note 268, at 352; JAY
KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT xiv (1984). Seven states have enacted
laws requiring informed consent for using genetic information. See ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 20-448.02 (West 1998); CAL. INS. CODE § 10148 (West Supp. 1999); MINN. STAT. § 72A.139
(1998); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-45 (1998); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-21-3 TO -4 (Michie Supp.
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health advocates agree that genetic testing should only occur after the
person has been fully informed of the potential results and conse-
quences of the test and the person has been given post-result counsel-
ing regardless of the results:
Although scientific breakthroughs make testing a viable option for
some individuals at risk for genetically linked disease, the indeter-
minate nature of test results combined with various concerns-
about lack of disease-appropriate treatment, or access thereto; po-
tential psychological harm to the person being tested; ramifica-
tions for other family members; possible breaches of privacy; and
the risk of discrimination based on positive results-must be con-
sidered by clinicians who plan to offer genetic testing. Indeed, the
ability to conduct such a test, particularly when viewed in conjunc-
tion with the repercussions of being tested, highlight the impor-
tance of the pre-test counseling process and a genuine expression
of informed consent .... These dilemmas are extraordinary. In-
deed, if nothing else, they point out the need for a new legal doc-
trine of informed consent to provide a framework for patients to
consider carefully, with their physicians, a decision to undergo ge-
netic testing.
327
d. Special Concerns for Testing Children
Another area where medical and ethical scholars have strongly
discouraged the use of mandatory or forced genetic testing involves
parents testing their children for genetic defects. Many have advo-
cated limiting the situations in which a parent can have his or her
child tested for the same reasons that mandatory testing should not be
allowed in adults-it may cause psychological trauma without offering
any benefit in terms of treatments or cures.328 The fear of giving chil-
dren information about their possible medical destiny is what has
prompted medical and-legal institutions to uniformly oppose the test-
ing of minors unless there is a clear benefit to the minor.329 These
institutions point to "the possibility of lowered self-esteem, stigmatiza-
tion, [and] family conflict."
330
1999); N.Y. INS. LAw § 2612 (McKinney Supp. 1999-2000); OR. REv. STAT. § 746.135
(1998).
327. Cooper, supra note 268, at 363-69.
328. See Abstracts, 15 IssuEs L. & MED. 227, 228 (1999) (reviewing Heather S. Cline,
Genetic Testing of Children: An Issue of Ethical and Legal Concern, PEDIATRIC NUResING, Jan.-Feb.
1999, at 61).
329. See Wertz, supra note 318, at 322. Statements have been made by the American
Society of Human Genetics, the American College of Medical Genetics, the American Med-
ical Association, and the Clinical Genetics Society in the United Kingdom. See id.
330. Id.
COURT-ORDERED GENETIC TESTINGWinter 20001
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
2. Risks to the Individual: Disclosure to Persons Outside the
Litigation
a. Fear of Discrimination
A court will also need to look at the risks associated with the po-
tential disclosure of the genetic information to persons outside of the
litigation. The actual act of testing produces information that has the
potential of being disclosed to people outside the lawsuit, possibly re-
sulting in negative consequences for the person tested. An additional
psychological burden results from societal discrimination and the la-
beling of the individual with the genetic defect.331 Individuals may
feel stigmatized or depressed because of their newly discovered status
of being genetically abnormal.3 3 2 Most importantly, these individuals
may be denied insurance coverage or employment because of their
disease, or they may be ridiculed or scorned by a society that neither
sympathizes with, nor understands, their condition.333 As a result of
persistent discrimination against them, these persons might feel less
worthy or unwanted by society.33 4 This negative treatment, coupled
with the nature of the future illness, could lead them to experience
feelings of worthlessness and depression, and could even make them
suicidal.3 3 5 The effects of stigmatization, along with the potential for
a future devastating illness, therefore, have severe psychological impli-
cations for the individuals involved.
3 36
b. Identifier in Criminal Investigations
Another risk associated with the disclosure of genetic information
is the use of genetics as an identifier in criminal investigations. Often,
companies that perform genetic testing maintain the results in a
database.3 3 7 The results of a court-ordered genetic test may be stored,
sometimes without the person's knowledge, and later used to identify
that individual by comparison testing.3 38 This information has previ-
ously been used by the Federal Bureau of Investigations and other law
331. See Kirke D. Weaver, J.D., Genetic Screening and the Right Not to Know, 13 IssuEs L. &
MED. 243, 256 (1997); Billings et al., supra note 312, at 476.
332. See Billings et al., supra note 312, at 479.
333. See id. at 476-79.
334. See id. at 479.
335. See id. at 252-57.
336. See id.
337. See Green & Thomas, supra note 308, at 577.
338. See id. at 578-80.
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enforcement agencies in capturing criminals.339 In theory, the infor-
mation in the database can be used outside of the law enforcement
area, violating the privacy of the person tested. 340 When genetic sci-
ence becomes more precise and sophisticated, it could lead to some-
one being identified solely by their genetic make-up, alleviating the
need for other types of identifiers. This type of identification is not
possible with the use of the medical records or ordinary medical infor-
mation currently available.
c. Protective Order Not an Adequate Remedy
A court may alleviate some of the risks associated with disclosing
genetic information by issuing a protective order. However, a protec-
tive order is not likely to cover the situation in which an insurance
company asks the applicant questions related to any known diseases or
genetic defects. A court cannot issue a protective order allowing the
person to lie or commit fraud while trying to obtain insurance. Even if
a person refuses to answer a question about genetic conditions be-
cause of the protective order, the insurance company is likely to infer
that a defect does exist and deny the application. 341 The potential dif-
ficulty of obtaining insurance is a major reason people choose not to
be genetically tested.342 Without any test results or any knowledge of a
genetic disorder, the individual has no information to give to these
entities.
The same concerns regarding the disclosure of private medical
information attached to HIV testing. A fundamental reason public
health officials have advocated for anonymous, voluntary, and confi-
dential testing is that people would not get tested if they knew the
information would be disclosed to their employers or insurance com-
panies. 343 Many people would go to independent HIV testing centers
that had no connection to an insurance company out of fear that their
own doctor would have to report the information to the insurance
company.344 The only way that people would get tested is if these pro-
339. See Peter Donnelly, D. Phil. & Richard D. Friedman, J.D., DNA Database Searches
and the Legal Consumption of Scientific Evidence, 97 MICH. L. REV. 931, 932-33 (1999).
340. For a more detailed examination of the DNA database debate, see Donnelly &
Friedman, supra note 339, at 934-62.
341. See generally Christine Gorman, The Doctor's Crystal Ball, TIME, Apr. 10, 1995, at 61
(explaining how numerous people of African and Mediterranean descent lost their insur-
ance because they participated in a screening campaign for sickle-cell anemia).
342. See Billings et al., supra note 312, at 481.
343. See supra Part III.B.
344. See Wertz, supra note 318, at 308.
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tections were in place. These same policy reasons have been advanced
by public health officials when they advocate for voluntary genetic
testing after the patient has been fully informed of the potential
consequences.
3 45
3. Informational Risks to Third Parties Outside the Lawsuit
The informational risks also impact people not involved in the
lawsuit, something a court must recognize and understand fully
before mandating genetic testing. Because genes are inherited, ge-
netic information about an individual is also information about her
children, parents, and siblings.3 46 In addition to the tested individual
suffering from increased anxiety and stress, a family member may suf-
fer severe psychological and emotional trauma from this information.
The family member, who is not a party to the litigation, has no legal
standing to prevent the test from occurring. The test may cause inter-
nal family strife because the family member has no control over the
decision to determine this medical information.3 47 Further, the ge-
netic information generated by the test could be used by employers
and insurance companies to discriminate against any blood relative of
the tested individual.3 48 A genetic test, therefore, impacts an entire
family and exposes its members to psychological, physical, and social
harms without their individual consent. 49 Although results from a ge-
netic test may not be affirmative proof of a genetic disorder, family
members may still suffer severe psychological harm from being forced
to decide whether to be tested themselves after a relative has tested
positive for a particular disease.
3 50
Psychological trauma is usually associated with a positive test re-
sult, but could also occur with a negative result. A negative result may
mean a positive result for some member of the family. For example, a
negative result could mean a child has tested positive for a genetic
disease. Because of the child's test result, the mother decides to get
tested and the result is negative. It then follows that the father is the
person who passed the defective gene to the child. Sometimes a nega-
tive result of one sibling is coupled with a positive result of another
345. See supra Part III.C.
346. See Green & Thomas, supra note 308, at 580.
347. See id. at 580-81.
348. See id. at 573, 580.
349. See id. at 580-84.
350. See id.
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sibling. The negative child will want to show joy and happiness, but is
unable to because of feelings of guilt for getting the "good" genes.
35'
4. Informational Risks to Society
Another unique feature of genetic information, and a factor that
courts must analyze, is its potential to be a common characteristic
within the subject's racial or ethnic community. For example, Tay-
Sachs disease is a genetically related disease that is associated with per-
sons of Ashkenazi Jewish heritage. 35 2 Thus, a minority group could
suffer stigmatization and discrimination not only based upon the per-
son's heritage, but also because of the group's common genetic com-
position. Genetic determinism may be the root of developing
repressive laws that will lead to a more entrenched course of discrimi-
nation.353 Common genetic traits within a community, therefore,
could be used to justify a society's discrimination toward a certain ra-
cial group or underclass. In particular, the information received from
a genetic test could be used by a court or a jury to further stigmatize
and stereotype an ethnic or racial minority because it is common to
the entire class. The informational risk to society is anoth'er factor that
should impact the ordering of a genetic test.
B. The Probative Value of the Information to the Court
1. The Admissibility of the Evidence
In addition to requiring courts to assess the informational risks
associated with ordering a test under Rule 35, the "examination of the
examination" approach requires the court to thoroughly evaluate the
usefulness of the genetic information to the lawsuit. Because discovery
requires that the information sought "be reasonably calculated to lead
to the discovery of admissible evidence,"3 54 courts theoretically should
begin evaluating the likelihood that the results will be admissible
before the test is even ordered. The broad scope of discovery, how-
351. See Weaver, supra note 331, at 244.
352. See Rachael Myerowitz & Norman D. Hogikyan, Different Mutations in Ashkenazi
Jewish and Non-Jewish French Canadians with Tay-Sachs Disease, 232 Sci. 1646, 1646 (1989),
available in 1986 WL 2338023.
353. See generally George P. Smith II,J.D. & ThaddeusJ. Burns,J.D., Genetic Determinism
or Genetic Discrimination? I IJ. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 23, 25 (1994) (stating that
abuse engendered by the mapping of the human genome and emergent DNA technology
"may result from discrimination based on the dissemination of key information about the
genotype of an individual-information revealing the risk factors inherent in that
individual").
354. FED. R. Crv. P. 26(B)(1).
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ever, does not require that the determination of admissibility be made
before ordering an examination. One applicable rule for determining
the admissibility of genetic evidence is Federal Rule of Evidence
403. 355 Pursuant to this rule, a court may determine that the test will
produce relevant information but still decide not to order the test if
the probative value of such information "is substantially outweighed
by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or mislead-
ing the jury."356 A federal court in Illinois applied this same analysis in
denying a Rule 35 motion by finding that the psychological tests
sought by the motion involved evaluative techniques that were not
useful to the court.
3 5 7
Evaluating the evidentiary importance of the test results before
ordering the test would prevent the court from forcing a party to un-
dergo a potentially traumatic test that will produce inadmissible evi-
dence. Ordering a test that could cause severe psychological trauma
and then not using the results during trial has no benefit to the mo-
vant, the person tested, or the litigation itself. Requiring the court to
determine whether the information sought is admissible before order-
ing a test, therefore, forces an immediate analysis of the usefulness of
this scientific evidence for purposes of the litigation.
Given that genetic tests for presymptomatic diseases do not pro-
duce definitive results, they can confuse or mislead the jury and cause
undue prejudice to the party opposing the test. This possibility is exac-
erbated by the already widespread use of science in the courtroom
and the public's perception that science is exact, reliable, and deter-
minative.3 58 Many applications of science and technology are already
widely used in criminal cases and these procedures are beginning to
make their way into civil cases.359 These applications seemingly involve
all branches of medical technology: blood typing, hair identification,
genetic screening, X-rays, neutron activation (chemical analysis of
materials by bombarding neutrons and detecting the uniquely charac-
teristic radiations that different chemical elements produce after neu-
tron capture), delicate organic chemistry (to determine cause of
death in poison cases), and identification by voice screening (mathe-
355. FED. R. EvIo. 403.
356. Id.
357. See Usher v. Lakewood Eng'g & Mfg Co., 158 F.R.D. 411, 413 (N.D. I1. 1994).
358. See generally Renee A. Forinash, Analyzing Scientific Evidence: From Validity to Reliabil-
ity with a Two-Step Approach, 24 ST. MARY'S L.J. 223, 245-54 (1992) (noting that jurors are
lulled by flawed scientific evidence introduced by expert witnesses).
359. See I MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE ch. 20, 360-88 (John W. Strong, ed., 4th ed. 1992).
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matical analysis of speech patterns) .360 As one legal scholar has stated,
"[i] n litigation, as in contemporary society, we have come to avert to
scientific and technological information with increasing frequency
and even dependence. '361 One report claims that scientific evidence
is used in nearly thirty percent of all court cases and that demand for
scientific expert testimony has risen dramatically.362
2. Confusion of Issues, Misleading the Jury, and Undue Prejudice
The increased courtroom reliance on scientific evidence has
been accompanied by growing concerns. In particular, both the scien-
tific and the legal community have questioned the customary court-
room presentations of scientific testimony, which characteristically
involve experts hired by adversaries who offer diametrically opposed
opinions. 363 Serious questions have arisen concerning the ability of
judges and lay jurors to evaluate and assign appropriate weight to
DNA evidence. 364 The goal of genetic experts, to provide the court
with nonpartisan scientific explanations of evidence through DNA evi-
dence, may be compromised by legal adversaries who are not as inter-
ested in scientific truth as in winning their cases. It is probable that
zealous attorneys will attempt to obtain genetic information about the
opposing party and use their experts to interpret the genetic data for
the jury. For example, defense attorneys in personal injury cases have
a high stake in trying to admit genetic evidence into court if it shows
that the life expectancy of the plaintiff is likely to be diminished.
Critics also believe judges do not have the necessary training,
time, or motivation to make accurate scientific judgments. 365 Too
often, lawyers and judges, as well as juries, look to the credentials of
scientific expert witnesses to validate scientific procedures instead of
educating themselves about these procedures. 366 Studies of jurors'
abilities to perceive, understand, and weigh scientific evidence have
yielded mixed results, with some showing that mock-jurors are unable
360. See id.
361. MICHAEL J. SAKS & RICHARD VAN DUIZEND, THE USE OF SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN
LITIGATION 3 (1983).
362. SeeJoannie M. Schrof, Courtroom Conundrum, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. Oct. 26,
(1992) at 67-68.
363. See Howard T. Markey, Science and Law: A Dialogue on Understanding, 68 A.B.A. J.
154, 156-57 (1982).
364. See Randolph N. Jonakait, J.D., Forensic Science: The Need for Regulation, 4 HARV. J.L.
& TECH. 109, 170-72 (1991).
365. See id.
366. See id. at 168.
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to interpret statistical testimony properly. 367 Genetic test results are
based on statistical probabilities, which will require expert explana-
tions, and will likely make the results difficult to understand.
As illustrated by the highly publicized use of genetic or DNA tech-
nology in the courtroom, scientific evidence has been generally
viewed as meriting greater weight than other types of evidence due to
its perceived reliability.3 68 Since the basic structure of the DNA mole-
cule was discovered in 1953, scientific research has produced a wide
range of applications of DNA technology, including the development
of reproductive technology, pharmaceuticals, human disease-treat-
ment methods, and other applications.3 69 These highly-publicized
uses of genetic evidence in criminal cases have sensitized the public,
as well as members of the legal community, to the scientific break-
throughs of DNA technology.
370
The mystique of genetic information and the increasing use of
genetic information to solve crimes have caused people to view all ge-
netic information as exact and reliable. The public is unlikely to read-
ily discern the differences between DNA-typing used in criminal cases
with the less accurate genetic screening for presymptomatic diseases.
Because genetic screening for diseases is not always accurate, the re-
sulting information may not improve the accuracy of the fact-finding
mission of the court and may even confuse the trier of fact.
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Any debate regarding the use of complicated scientific evidence
has always involved an examination of how the evidence will help the
trier of fact, a determination required under Federal Rule of Evidence
403.37 1 Genetic testing highlights the danger of allowing litigants to
use what appears to the court to be an objective tool in finding the
truth, when in reality the information produced by the tests is open to
a wide variety of interpretations. Courts must deconstruct the estab-
lished view that all uses of genetic science are accurate methods of
finding the truth sought in a lawsuit. In determining genetic science's
value in the courtroom, courts need to balance the potential positive
effects of the scientific innovation and the litigants' expectation of
fairness with the goal of deconstructing any preconceived notions of
the technology.3 7 2 The current state of genetic testing makes this pro-
cess quite difficult for the court, but it is necessary given the grave
dangers of ordering a person to submit to a test for a terminal genetic
condition.
3. The Probative Value of Genetic Information to the Court
Scientists have developed and will continue to develop genetic
tests that determine different levels of risk for genetic conditions.
These conditions may have symptoms ranging from mild to severe,
they may have evolving treatments, and they may appear at widely va-
rying ages, if at all.373 The many ethical problems with mandating
such tests revolve around these uncertainties. The fewer the uncer-
tainties that exist about a test, the more useful the information will be
to the litigation.
The most likely use of genetic information will be in determining
life expectancy. With the aid of mortality tables, statistics on the death
rates related to cancer, heart disease or tobacco use have all been ad-
mitted to prove diminished life expectancy. 374 However, genetic test-
ing for most diseases is still too uncertain to evaluate a person's life
span.3 75 Often, these genetic tests precede any symptoms, and the test
result is generally too speculative as to when the disease will manifest
itself and its potential severity.3 76 Further, even though a cure may not
be available for a particular disease when the test is sought, it does not
371. See Fed. R. Evid. 403.
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373. See supra Parts ILA-I1.B.
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preclude the discovery of a cure-within the lifetime of the individual
tested. 377 A positive test result, therefore, is usually too attenuated
from the claim of future damages to be useful to determine lifespan3 7
As illustrated by the three diseases discussed in Part II, the corre-
sponding genetic tests will prove to have different levels of usefulness
to the court. For example, the test for Alzheimer's Disease is not likely
to be valuable to the court given that at least half of the patients with
the disease do not test positive for the e4 allele, the mutation that
shows a susceptibility to Alzheimer's. 379 Meanwhile, many with the al-
lele never develop the disease. 380 Based on the unreliability of the test
for Alzheimer's, the results are likely to mislead and confuse the jury.
A test for HD, where the test is more accurate,381 may be more valua-
ble to the trier of fact. The accuracy of the test, however, does not
necessarily tell the court anything about the severity of the disease or
exactly when death will occur.3 82 Geneticists hope that one day they
will be able to refine the tests to eliminate these variables, and thus
alleviate the ethical concerns associated with these tests. Development
of greater predictive value will then place genetic testing firmly in the
realm of other medical information. Until that happens, courts must
exercise great caution in ordering a test that will do nothing to pro-
mote a more fair process for litigants.
Conclusion
With the constant influx of new genetic technology in our every-
day lives, it is no surprise that genetic information is beginning to per-
vade our courtrooms. However, genetic information has great
potential to cause significant harm to the individual being tested and
to society as a whole. There are times when genetic information will
be of obvious benefit to courts, as illustrated by the wide and success-
ful use of DNA evidence in criminal cases. The use of this technology,
however, does not necessarily mean that the process will aid the fact-
finding mission of the court. A balance needs to be struck between
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378. See id. at 702 (arguing that, because there is always a possibility that a cure could
be found, "a positive predictive genetic result is probably too remote to be relevant" in
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the usefulness of the information to the courts and the potentially
damaging psychological and physical effects of the information.
The ease with which HIV testing has been ordered and the per-
ceived reliability of genetic tests should give genetic and legal ethicists
great cause for concern. As courts have generally focused on the "in
controversy" and "good cause" requirements of Rule 35, they rarely
examine the procedures to be used in the examination and the infor-
mation that will be produced. This simple analysis is outdated by the
advent of genetic tests for presymptomatic diseases. As each genetic
test produces a variety of types of information, sometimes revealing a
life-threatening condition, courts must extend their analysis to in-
clude a thorough "examination of the examination." Otherwise,
courts may be faced with the prospect of giving a civil litigant a "death
sentence" while providing no substantial benefit to the administration
of justice.
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